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INTRODUCTION 
The propriety of imposing tort liability for negligent speech has been 
the subject of controversy since before the First Amendment‘s 
incorporation. The debate over whether and to what extent civil liability 
may be socially desirable for unreasonably dangerous speech has 
intensified in recent years as entertainment media have become more 
explicitly violent and widely available. Experts have long concurred that 
exposure to all forms of violence is a cause of increased societal violence. 
Recent research on children‘s brain development indicates that children 
are exceptionally vulnerable to violent media influences, and numerous 
risks to society are created by children‘s exposure to violent video games 
in particular. 
Video games are a unique form of media due to their interactive and 
repetitive cognitive programming characteristics, which render them a 
special danger to children. Accordingly, the contemporary controversy 
over regulating allegedly unreasonably dangerous speech has centered on 
the harmful effects that violent video games can have on a child‘s 
neurological and physiological health, which in turn can manifest in acts 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/1
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of violence toward others. Numerous state legislatures have responded to 
the scientific research by regulating the sale of violent video games to 
children. Lower federal courts have consistently declared such legislative 
action a First Amendment violation, and during the summer of 2011, the 
Supreme Court broadly declared that violent video games are fully 
protected speech and that state sales regulations are subject to strict 
scrutiny.
1
  
The Supreme Court has never reviewed the constitutionality of 
imposing civil liability for unreasonably dangerous speech. Lower courts 
have generally rejected tort liability for speech on a theory of negligence. 
Further, lower courts have unanimously rejected tort liability for injuries 
allegedly caused by violent video games. The controversial scientific 
evidence concerning the harrowing potential effects that violent video 
games can have on children‘s brains and behavior warrants review of the 
lower courts‘ rules immunizing dangerous speech. A constitutionalized2 
form of negligence liability for unreasonably dangerous speech that 
foreseeably causes actual injury should be considered, and the effects of 
violent video games on children present the most compelling case for 
recognizing such liability. 
All forms of government regulation of protected speech are bounded by 
the First Amendment. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
recognized that tort liability constitutes state action and is therefore subject 
to constitutional scrutiny. Historically, the Supreme Court‘s approach to 
analyzing the constitutionality of criminal regulation of speech has been 
different than its approach to analyzing the constitutionality of tort liability 
for speech. The Court has constitutionalized a variety of tort claims arising 
from speech and created a balancing framework for reconciling First 
Amendment values with the state‘s interest in punishing and deterring 
injurious speech, as opposed to applying strict scrutiny for criminal 
regulation of speech.
3
 The Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Snyder v. 
 
 
 1. See Brown v. Entm‘t Merchs. Ass‘n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). Lower courts have unanimously 
found that violent video games are fully protected speech, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n. This finding could possibly be challenged relative to violent video 
games and children, based on experts‘ conclusions concerning the subliminal and potentially lasting 
effects that the games have on children‘s cognitive functioning and lower courts‘ findings that 
subliminal ―speech‖ is unprotected by the First Amendment. See Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 
1144, 1148 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Vance v. Judas Priest, Nos. 86-5844, 86-3939, 1990 WL 130920, at *32 
(Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990). This Article assumes that violent video games are protected speech.  
 2. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 766 (1985) (White, J., 
concurring) (―New York Times v. Sullivan was the first major step in what proved to be a seemingly 
irreversible process of constitutionalizing the entire law of libel and slander.‖).  
 3. The Court has also applied a form of intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech due to its 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Phelps immunized from civil liability a narrow class of harassing and 
invasive speech that was predominantly political in nature, caused 
primarily emotional upset, and was disseminated through traditional public 
sidewalk picketing.
4
 Snyder v. Phelps was specifically limited to its 
extraordinary facts and does not control the constitutionality of imposing 
tort liability on a theory of negligence for unreasonably dangerous speech 
that can be proven to cause tangible injury.  
The Supreme Court‘s recent criminal sales regulation decision in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n5 also does not control the issue 
of negligence liability for actual harm caused by children‘s consumption 
of violent video games. Criminal penalties for sales require no proof of 
actual harm to be enforced and risks chilling speech that does not actually 
cause harm. Tort liability is inherently more narrowly tailored than 
criminal regulation by virtue of the proof elements necessary to establish a 
claim in a particular case, including proof of actual harm to the plaintiff 
and both factual and proximate causation. Carefully circumscribed 
negligence liability for speech that is clearly unreasonably dangerous and 
that can be proven to have caused serious injury or death in an individual 
case may optimize social values. This Article considers how tort liability 
for actual harms caused to children (and others) by unreasonably 
dangerous speech might be conceived and proposes reform. The effect of 
violent video games on children is used to exemplify the civil liability 
analysis proposed herein. 
Part I of this Article surveys the scientific evidence concerning the 
neurological and behavioral problems that are known to exist among 
children who play a lot of violent video games and distinguishes between 
direct harm to children‘s brains and the more general risk of increased 
societal violence. Part II reviews the game producers‘ apparent fault and 
tort policy, and concludes that tort immunity for unreasonably dangerous 
speech has created an imbalance of rights that operates to undermine the 
goals of tort law and public welfare. Part III reviews the lower courts‘ 
negligent speech jurisprudence and summarizes the development of the 
two strains of immunity rules lower courts created based on tort and 
constitutional doctrine. Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court‘s balancing 
approach to tort liability for speech and distills the Court‘s general 
 
 
profit-driven hardiness and relative invulnerability to chilling. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980).  
 4. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (concerning sidewalk picketing of the Westboro 
Baptist Church at funerals for fallen service members). 
 5. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/1
  
 
 
 
 
2012] CONSTITUTIONALIZED NEGLIGENCE  1069 
 
 
 
 
evidentiary tailoring method of reconciling tort and constitutional policies 
relative to defamation and a few other speech-torts. Part V demonstrates 
that lower courts have departed from the Supreme Court‘s general speech-
tort balancing approach to tort liability for allegedly negligent speech and 
points out flaws in the lower courts‘ analyses. Part VI proposes an 
analytical paradigm for reviewing liability for harm caused by 
unreasonably dangerous speech derived from the Supreme Court‘s speech-
tort analytical framework, and then illustrates how the test might be 
applied relative to violent video games and children.  
I. THE DANGERS THAT VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES POSE TO CHILDREN AND 
SOCIETY  
The Supreme Court of the United States and the American Academy of 
Pediatrics have reached very different conclusions concerning the social 
effects of violent media: 
 The State‘s evidence is not compelling. California relies 
primarily on the research of Dr. Craig Anderson and a few other 
research psychologists whose studies purport to show a connection 
between exposure to violent video games and harmful effects on 
children. . . . They do not prove that violent video games cause 
minors to act aggressively . . . .
6
 
 Exposure to violence in media, including television, movies, 
music, and video games, represents a significant risk to the health of 
children and adolescents. Extensive research evidence indicates that 
media violence can contribute to aggressive behavior, 
desensitization to violence, nightmares, and fear of being 
harmed. . . . The evidence is now clear and convincing: media 
violence is [one] of the causal factors of real-life violence and 
aggression. . . . The debate should be over.
7
 
This Part reviews scientific evidence demonstrating that violent video 
games pose serious health risks to children and society. This Part 
distinguishes indirect social harm, i.e., intervening acts of violence that 
may be caused by exposure to violent media generally and violent video 
games in particular, from direct neurological harm that can be caused by 
 
 
 6. Entm‟t Merchs. Ass‟n, 131 S. Ct. at 2739 (emphasis in original).  
 7. American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement-Media Violence, 124 PEDIATRICS 1495, 
1495–96 (2009).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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playing violent video games, particularly among children. The distinction 
is important to both tort and constitutional analyses.
8
  
A. Research on the Indirect Social Effects of Media Violence 
There is no legitimate dispute over whether consumption of all forms 
of violent media is substantially correlated with violent behavior, 
particularly among children.
9
 The controversy concerns causation theories 
that explain the correlation. In social science research, the causes of 
behavior are necessarily theoretical where controlled studies to prove 
causation could harm child subjects.
10
 Experts concur, however, that to the 
extent that violent media causes subsequent aggression, causation is 
typically a slow, cumulative, desensitizing cognitive process
11
 that can 
lower a person‘s inhibition to violence and cause him to adopt violent 
behavior as a means of conflict resolution.
12
 A related theory posits that 
 
 
 8. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n, California originally raised both types of injury 
to support its authority to regulate the sale of extremely violent ―deviant or morbid‖ video games to 
children. 131 S. Ct. at 2732. However, California dropped the general social harm basis for the law 
and ultimately relied exclusively on the direct neurological harm to children. Id. at 2738–39; see also 
Video Software Dealers Ass‘n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 961 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the 
scientific briefs presented to the Supreme Court did not focus exclusively on the direct neurological 
harm to children, and the Court ultimately conflated the two distinct forms of harm in its opinion. See 
Entm‟t Merchs. Ass‟n, 131 S. Ct. at 2739. 
 9. See VICTOR C. STRASBURGER, BARBARA J. WILSON & AMY B. JORDAN, CHILDREN, 
ADOLESCENTS, AND THE MEDIA 175–78 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the prevailing theories of causation 
that explain the correlation between violent media and violent behavior); American Academy of 
Pediatrics, supra note 7 (discussing the dangerous effects of violent media on children); DEPT. OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2001), available 
at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/34353300/Youth-Violence-A-Report-of-the-Surgeon-General-2001 
(reviewing statistics on youth violence and the effects of violent media on youth violence). In one 
report, 3500 studies reviewed the relationship between media violence and violent behavior, and all 
but eighteen found a relationship. See Marybeth Hicks, Reject Violent Video Games, WASHINGTON 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at A22 (citing MARY STROM LARSON, WATCH IT!: WHAT PARENTS NEED TO 
KNOW TO RAISE MEDIA-SMART KIDS (2009)) (discussing the popularity of first-person shooter 
games).  
 10. It would be unethical to subject children to violent media that is believed to harm them to 
prove cause and effect, so the known correlation must be explained by causation theories. E-mail from 
Elizabeth Gershoff, Assoc. Professor, Dept. of Human Dev. and Family Scis. & Population Research 
Ctr., Univ. of Tex., to author (Dec. 17, 2010 4:02 EST) (on file with author). 
 11. See, e.g., STRASBURGER ET AL., supra note 9, at 175–78 (discussing the prevailing theories of 
causation that explain the correlation between violent media and violent behavior). Although children 
are known to mimic behavior immediately, this is distinguishable from the slow, cumulative effects of 
violent media that are believed to desensitize children to violence systematically, which can lead to 
lower inhibitions to perpetrating acts of violence. See Telephone Interview with Craig Anderson, 
Professor of Psychol. and Dir. of the Ctr. for the Study of Violence, Iowa State Univ. (June 2, 2010) 
(notes on file with author).  
 12. Social scientists believe that exposure to violent media causes antisocial behavior in children, 
and that the media influence children cognitively over a period of time. See, e.g., VICTOR C. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/1
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aggressive behavior is developed and maintained through ―cognitive 
scripts,‖ which are ―mental routines‖ stored in memory that guide 
behavior in social situations resembling situations presented in media, 
such that exposure to large quantities of violence may ―prime‖ the viewer 
to attribute hostile motives to others in ambiguous situations and to recall 
and execute violent responses to real-life conflicts.
13
  
Recognized experts in developmental psychology concur. The 
American Academy of Pediatrics released a sobering Policy Statement in 
November 2009, warning its members about the health risks posed by 
children‘s consumption of violent media, and urging its members to track 
children‘s violent media consumption and to educate parents about the 
games‘ dangerous health effects.14 The Academy found that consumption 
 
 
STRASBURGER, ADOLESCENTS AND THE MEDIA: MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT 37 (1995) 
(the research on media violence and its effect on behavior is ―compelling and clear,‖ aggression is a 
learned behavior, media violence is a ―socially significant‖ cause of violence in society, and young 
children are particularly vulnerable); FEDERAL TRADE COMM‘N, MARKETING VIOLENT 
ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A REVIEW OF SELF-REGULATION AND INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE 
MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC RECORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES ii (2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/vioreport.pdf (most of the research on the impact of media 
violence on children reveals a ―high correlation‖ between exposure to media violence and aggressive 
and/or violent behavior); see also STRASBURGER ET AL., supra note 9, at 156–74 (discussing the 
effects of media violence on children and teenagers, such as its contribution to aggressive behavior). 
Research demonstrating correlations between viewing violent media and aggressive behavior date 
back to the mid 1980s. See Edward Donnerstein & Daniel Linz, Mass Media Sexual Violence and 
Male Viewers: Current Theory and Research, 29 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 601 (1986); Russell G. Geen 
& Susan L. Thomas, The Immediate Effects of Media Violence on Behavior, 42 J. SOC. ISSUES 7 
(1986); L. Rowell Huesmann, Psychological Processes Promoting the Relation Between Exposure to 
Media Violence and Aggressive Behavior by the Viewer, 42 J. SOC. ISSUES 125 (1986); Brendan G. 
Rule & Tamara J. Ferguson, The Effects of Media Violence on Attitudes, Emotions, and Cognitions, 42 
J. SOC. ISSUES 29 (1986); Charles W. Turner et al., Naturalistic Studies of the Long-Term Effects of 
Television Violence, 42 J. SOC. ISSUES 51 (1986); see also Emily Campbell, Comment, Television 
Violence: Social Science vs. The Law, 10 LOY. ENT. L.J. 413 (1990) (analyzing the social science 
research). 
 13. STRASBURGER ET AL., supra note 9, at 167–68; see also American Academy of Pediatrics, 
supra note 7, at 1497–98 (children imitate and adopt behaviors that they are exposed to, and violent 
video games associate rewards and positive feelings with hurting others, a dangerous association). In 
addition, playing violent video games has been shown to cause ―hostile attribution bias,‖ meaning that 
the player‘s perception of an ambiguous occurrence, such as being bumped in a hallway, will tend 
toward viewing the occurrence as motivated by hostility as opposed to an innocent accident, which in 
turn tends to elicit a hostile response in the player. See Daphne Bavelier et al., Brains on Video Games, 
12 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 763, 765 (2011). 
 14. Adolescents‘ critical period of brain development concerning world view and executive 
decision making renders them unusually vulnerable to violent media, which prompted The American 
Academy of Pediatrics to advise pediatricians to inquire about violent media consumption as part of 
children‘s ―well visit‖ procedures, and to educate parents about the serious risks that violent media 
pose to minors:  
The evidence is now clear and convincing: media violence is [one] of the causal factors of 
real-life violence and aggression. Therefore, pediatricians and parents need to take action. . . . 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of violent media can cause a variety of mental health problems for children 
and adolescents. These health problems include aggressive and violent 
behavior, bullying, desensitization to violence, fearful worldviews—
including ―mean world syndrome,‖ depression, and sleep disturbances.15 
Social scientists also concur that children‘s exposure to violent media is a 
―socially significant‖ cause of later antisocial attitudes and conduct, which 
explains the substantial correlation between such exposure and subsequent 
aggressive and/or antisocial behavior.
16
 Interpersonal violence is now a 
more prevalent health risk for children, adolescents, and young adults 
―than infectious disease, cancer, or congenital disorders.‖17 A leading 
suicide researcher is concerned about increases in suicide rates among 
young Americans that may result from desensitization to violence and 
pain, which can be produced effectively by playing violent video games.
18
 
Violent video games are distinguishable from other forms of violent 
media such as television, motion pictures, and music because they are 
interactive and repetitive. That is, the players participate in the violence 
virtually in the ―first-person,‖ meaning that the players manipulate hand-
held devices to kill other players onscreen while they attempt to avoid 
 
 
[T]he entertainment industry, the American public, politicians, and parents all have been 
reluctant to accept these findings and to take action. The debate should be over.  
See American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 7, at 1495–96.  
 15. See id. at 1497. The Academy of Pediatrics also found that:  
The strength of the association between media violence and aggressive behavior found in 
meta-analyses is greater than the association between calcium intake and bone mass, lead 
ingestion and lower IQ, and condom nonuse and sexually acquired HIV infection, and is 
nearly as strong as the association between cigarette smoking and lung cancer—associations 
that clinicians accept and on which preventive medicine is based without question. 
Id. ―Mean world syndrome‖ refers to the perception that the world is a dangerous place and can be 
cultivated from viewing quantities of violent media. Id. 
 16. See STRASBURGER, supra note 12, at 37. 
 17. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 7, at 1498; see also YOUTH VIOLENCE: A 
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 9 (discussing data on youth violence and the effects of 
violent media). 
 18. Interview with Thomas Joiner, Professor of Psychol., Fla. State Univ. (June 16, 2010) (notes 
on file with author). Two processes intersect to cause suicide: (1) desensitization to physical pain, 
injury or death, and (2) a desire for death. Violent video games are relevant to the first process and 
constitute a moderately powerful desensitization device to suicide. The most recent suicide data reveal 
that the highest rate of suicide has dropped from age 65 and older—the longstanding age group with 
highest suicide rates—to 45–55 year olds. Id. In addition, suicide is the fourth leading cause of death 
among young adults, which could relate to the affect of violent video games on the desensitization 
process. See, e.g., MEG MEEKER, YOUR KIDS AT RISK: HOW TEEN SEX THREATENS OUR SONS AND 
DAUGHTERS 67–69 (2007) (attributing the high teen suicide rate in part to teen depression and 
hopelessness caused by sexually transmitted disease diagnoses); Healthy Youth!, CTR. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/injury/index.htm#1. Depression factors into Professor 
Joiner‘s second suicide process. See Interview with Thomas Joiner, Professor of Psychology, Fla. State 
Univ. (June 16, 2010) (on file with author).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/1
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being killed.
19
 Players can connect to the internet and choose team 
members from all over the world, communicate verbally with audio 
devices to strategize plays, and learn new ways to maximize ―kills,‖ the 
ultimate game goal. The Call of Duty game series is among the most 
popular in the world and has become ―a way of life‖ for adolescent males 
in particular.
20
 Call of Duty is a ―blood-splattered, military battlefield 
video game‖ where players move through virtual ―battlefields shooting at 
the enemy—and getting shot at,‖ and the screen displays a record of of the 
number of kills for each team.
21
 The game also displays each gamer‘s 
statistics, such as the number of kills for each player, how many times the 
player has been shot, and how long he has been playing.
22
 Players are 
ranked worldwide based on their lifetime kills, which confers social status 
among players.
23
 In sum, repetitive acts of violence and efficient killing 
sprees are the key to winning and are rewarded by game points, access to 
more effective weapons, and onscreen pop-up accolades.
24
 
All people are influenced by repetitive cognitive associations, which 
become implicit over time, a normal cognitive programming process that 
aids in learning, memory, and efficient mental processing of 
environmental data.
25
 Once formed, implicit cognitive associations have a 
 
 
 19. See Ken Hoffman, Call of Duty Video Game Has Become a Way of Life, HOUSTON CHRON., 
July 19, 2010, http://www.chron.com/life/hoffman/article/Hoffman-Call-of-Duty-video-game-has-
become-a-way-1699515.php; Marybeth Hicks, Reject Violent Video Games, WASHINGTON TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 2009, at A22 (discussing the popularity of first-person shooter games); Philip Elmer-DeWitt 
& John F. Dickerson, Too Violent for Kids?, TIME (Sept. 27, 1993), http://www.time.com/time/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,979298,00.html (discussing first-person experiences in first-person shooter 
games). 
 20. See Hoffman, supra note 19.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Interview with Ryan Alexander Pollard, eighth-grade cadet (and the author‘s son), Marine 
Military Acad. (Feb. 25, 2011) (notes on file with author). For example, milestones such as the number 
of a particular type of kills appear on the screen during play, such as: ―Congratulations, you have shot 
100 players in the head.‖ Id. 
 25. These are general processes that underlie all types of cognitive learning and social behavior, 
not just aggression and violence. See Brief for California State Senator Leland Y. Yee, Ph.D, et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Schwarzenegger v. Video Software Dealers Ass‘n, 130 S. Ct. 
2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 2937557 at *1A (Statement on Video Game Violence); see also 
e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) (illustrating how implicit 
biases pertaining to race manifest in judgment and perception of events); Justin D. Levinson, 
Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 
(2007) (explaining how implicit racial bias affects judges and jurors in ―encoding, storing, and 
recalling relevant case facts‖); Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The 
Case For A Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 
917–20 (1999) (explaining how cognitive associations are created and maintained, and applying theory 
to creation and maintenance of implicit bias). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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resilient and lasting effect on a person‘s perception, judgment, and 
behavior beyond the person‘s conscious awareness.26 Children‘s and 
adolescents‘27 exceptional vulnerability to media influences is well-
established and may be explained by the state of their brain development. 
Relatively recent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies confirm 
enormous activity in adolescents‘ prefrontal cortex—the area responsible 
for moral development and executive decision-making and control.
28
 The 
brain growth includes rapid formation of neural connections, cognitive 
associations, and schemas that influence adolescents‘ perception of the 
world and appropriate social conduct in conjunction with a ―pruning‖ 
process that discards weak or undeveloped associations in favor of 
associations that have been reinforced based on the adolescents‘ 
experiences during this critical period of knowledge assimilation, 
cognitive reorganization, and brain maturation.
29
 Children are known to be 
 
 
 26. See supra note 25; see also JUSTIN D. LEVINSON, DANIELLE M. YOUNG & LAURIE A. 
RUDMAN, Implicit Racial Bias, A Social Science Overview, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE 
LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., forthcoming 2012).  
 27. The terms ―children‖ and ―minors‖ are used interchangeably herein, and refer to persons 
under eighteen years of age. The term ―adolescents‖ refers to minors who are between thirteen and 
seventeen years of age. 
 28. See, e.g., Sarah-Jayne Blackmore & Suparna Choudhury, Development of the Adolescent 
Brain: Implications for Executive Function and Social Cognition, 47 J. OF CHILD PSYCHOL. & 
PSYCHIATRY 296, 301–02 (2006) (discussing implications of brain development for executive 
functions and social cognition during puberty and adolescence; ―inhibitory control, processing speed, 
working memory and decision-making continue[] to develop during adolescence . . . . [D]uring 
[adolescence], what is perceived as important in the social world . . . changes and leaves its imprint on 
the pruning process‖); see also infra note 29. 
 29. See, e.g., Todd S. Braver et al., Flexible Neural Mechanisms of Cognitive Control Within 
Human Prefrontal Cortex, 106 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 7351 (2009) (―temporal dynamics in younger 
adults fit a proactive control pattern . . . whereas in older adults a reactive control pattern was found.‖); 
Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. 
ACAD. SCI. 77, 82–83 (2004) (explaining that teenagers‘ brains are forming connections and pruning, 
and a teenager‘s experiences have a powerful effect on the structure of their brain); Jay N. Giedd et al., 
Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE 861, 862–63 (1999) (during adolescence, an overproduction of synapses in teenagers‘ 
brains makes their experiences influential on how their brains develop; this ―may herald a critical stage 
of development when the environment or activities of the teenager may guide selective synapse 
elimination during adolescence.‖); Jay N. Giedd et al., A Quantitative MRI Study of the Corpus 
Callosum in Children and Adolescents, 91 DEVELOPMENTAL BRAIN RES. 274, 278–79 (1996) (regions 
of the corpus callosum with higher associations increase throughout adolescence; while some 
―elements of adult cognition are in place around age 12, speed, capacity, and ability on mental tasks, 
especially those of higher order, can continue to improve well into adulthood.‖); William T. 
Greenough, James E. Black & Christopher S. Wallace, Experience and Brain Development, 58 CHILD 
DEV. 539, 550 (1987) (new synapses are produced in teenagers‘ brains in response to their 
experiences, greater experiences lead to more synapse connections, and synapses are generated to 
―provide information to be encoded into the nervous system.‖); Tomas Paus, Mapping Brain 
Maturation and Cognitive Development During Adolescence, 9 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 60, 64 
(2005) (―[D]uring adolescence, brain maturation continues in the fronto-parietal systems and within 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/1
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more impressionable due to brain immaturity and instability, and they are 
at greater risk for being influenced generally.
30
 Repetitive associations 
created by violent video games likely have a deeper and more lasting 
cognitive effect on children than adults, as adult brains are mature and 
more resilient to influences and changes to brain processing, such as the 
creation of cognitive associations.
31
  
Violent video games pose the greatest risk to children due to their 
interactive and repetitive nature.
32
 Repetition creates, maintains, and 
entrenches unconscious cognitive associations, and gamers‘ instigation of 
virtual acts of violence necessitates desensitization and acceptance of 
violence to avoid cognitive dissonance.
33
 Experts believe that violent 
video games create cognitive associations between violent actions and 
positive feelings and rewards because violent actions undertaken 
repetitively by video game players are positively reinforced through game 
points and other accolades, and players enjoy winning.
34
 This belief is 
consistent with cognitive learning theory generally, and very recent brain 
scan research offers confirming data.
35
 In sum, while media violence 
generally influences children more than adults, violent video games‘ 
repetitive and interactive nature makes them particularly effective in 
programming children to feel, think, and behave aggressively.  
 
 
the superior temporal sulcus (STS) . . . . [D]uring adolescence, high demands are placed not only on 
the executive systems but also on the interplay between cognitive and emotion-related processes.‖). 
 30. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 7, at 1498. Results of three recent studies 
examining ―interactive-media-violence‖ effects showed greater risk of interactive media than passive 
viewing of violent media:  
[T]hese rapidly growing and ever-more-sophisticated [interactive violent video games] have 
indicated that the effects of child-initiated virtual violence may be even more profound than 
those of passive media such as television . . . . [As] the child or teenager is ―embedded‖ in the 
game and uses a ―joystick‖ (handheld controller) that enhances both the experience and 
aggressive feelings.  
Id. According to Craig Anderson, whether video games cause more harm to children than passive 
media is still controversial, although recent studies support the theory that violent video games are 
more dangerous, and, theoretically, playing interactive ―first-person shooter‖ games likely causes 
greater harm to children than passively watching violent media. E-mail from Craig Anderson, Dir. of 
the Ctr. for the Study of Violence, Iowa St. Univ., to author (Mar. 28, 2012, 15:13:55 CDT) (on file 
with author).  
 33. See supra notes 11–12 and 25.  
 34. See supra note 25.  
 35. See infra Part I.B. 
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B. Research on Video Games‟ Effects on Brain Functioning 
The repetitive nature of video games renders them an incredible 
training tool. There is no doubt in the scientific community that video 
games can teach, train, and program human beings to think differently, 
process information differently, respond to cues differently, and change a 
player‘s understanding, views, and behavior relative to the subject of the 
game.
36
 Video games can enhance many skills, including visuospatial 
capacity, visual acuity, task switching, speed of processing, and statistical 
inference, and can enhance low-level vision and visual attention.
37
 
Additionally, ―[b]ecause behavioral changes arise from brain changes, it is 
also no surprise that performance improvements are paralleled by enduring 
physical and functional neurological remodeling.‖38  
Video games program brains consistent with their content. Researchers 
have determined that ―playing pro-social games led to more ‗helping‘ 
behavior, whereas playing a violent game led to more ‗harming‘ 
behavior.‖39 Leading researchers in the effects of video games on the mind 
and behavior concur that ―[t]here is no question that the same 
characteristics that make many games effective teachers of perceptual and 
cognitive skills can also be harnessed to produce maladaptive effects on 
brain and behaviour.‖40 The evidence that violent video games produce 
garden-variety antisocial conduct (such as responding to an ambiguous 
bump in a hallway with aggression) is much stronger than the evidence 
that violent video games induce criminal or serious physical violence.
41
  
Consumption of violent video games has been shown to be correlated 
with young male subjects associating violent images, such as knife attacks, 
with images that elicit pleasure universally, such as an image of a smiling 
baby.
42
 These counterintuitive associations were not found among subjects 
who were not exposed to a large quantity of violent video games.
43
 The 
 
 
 36. See Bavelier et al., supra note 13, at 763–65.  
 37. Id. at 763. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 764. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 765.  
 42. See Kira Bailey, Robert West & Craig A. Anderson, The Influence of Video Games on Social, 
Cognitive, and Affective Information Processing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
NEUROSCIENCE 1001 (Jean Decety & John T. Cacioppo eds., 2011). For more detail on the scientific 
research concerning children‘s and adolescents‘ vulnerability to altered brain activity resulting from 
playing violent video games, see Deana Pollard Sacks, California‟s Interest in Schwarzenegger v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association (Jan. 17, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
works.bepress.com/deana_pollard/10/. 
 43. Id. 
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new research is consistent with functional MRI (fMRI) studies produced 
over the past decade that have found that violent video game consumption 
may alter children‘s brain activity patterns and cause them to mimic the 
patterns of children with ―conduct disorder,‖ i.e., violent and antisocial 
behavioral problems.
44
 These cognitive distinctions among children 
probably result from their developmental vulnerability to altered brain 
activity patterns, a function of rapid neural development, and a result 
predicated by cognitive learning theory and Hebb‘s Law, which holds that 
―neurons that fire together wire together.‖45 That is, cognitive associations 
that are made repetitively become entrenched and resilient to change,
46
 
particularly among children and adolescents whose growth process and 
attendant unstable cognitive matrix render them vulnerable to influence—a 
vulnerability adults do not share. Similar research on children‘s immature 
brain areas governing morality and executive function, and their 
developmental vulnerability to negative influences and poor choices, has 
persuaded legislators and the Supreme Court to determine that capital 
punishment of minors is unconstitutional.
47
  
Scientists at Indiana University School of Medicine published the 
results of the first longitudinal, experimental brain imaging investigation 
of video game play in healthy, young adult males on December 2, 2011.
48
 
 
 
 44. Telephone Interview with Craig Anderson, Dir. of the Ctr. for the Study of Violence, Iowa 
State Univ. (Dec. 9, 2010). Most of the studies to date concern physical aggression and violent media, 
although newer research reveals that altered brain activity patterns can result from consumption of 
violent video games. See, e.g., Press Release, Radiological Soc‘y of N. Am., Violent Video Games 
Trigger Unusual Brain Activity in Aggressive Adolescents (Dec. 2, 2002), available at http:// 
people.ee.duke.edu/~jshorey/MRIHomepage/violent.html; Marcus Yam, Study: Violent Video Games 
Affect Brains, DAILYTECH (Dec. 1, 2006 5:17 AM), http://www.sosparents.org/DailyTech%20-%20 
Study_%20Violent%20Video%20Games%20Affect%20Brains.pdf; see also Bavelier et al., supra note 
13, at 765–66 (among other things, the ―frontostriatal pathway,‖ which mediates both drug addiction 
and behavioral disorders, is activated by certain video games). 
 45. See Deana Pollard Sacks, Children‟s Developmental Vulnerability and the Roberts Court‟s 
Child-Protective Jurisprudence: An Emerging Trend?, 40 STETSON L. REV. 777, 779–84 (2011) 
(discussing cognitive learning theory and ―Hebb‘s Law‖ relative to children‘s developmental 
vulnerability).  
 46. See, e.g., Pollard, supra note 24, at 920.  
 47. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–71 (2005) (recognizing that juveniles‘ brains and 
character are not fully developed and that the majority of states prohibit capital punishment of 
juveniles, concluding that capital punishment for crimes committed under the age of eighteen is 
unconstitutional); see also Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain, 305 SCI. 
MAG. 596, 599 (2004), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1225 (―The brain‘s frontal 
lobe, which exercises restraint over impulsive behavior, ‗doesn‘t begin to mature until 17 years of 
age.‘‖ (quoting neuroscientist Ruben Gur of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia)); Mark 
Moran, Adolescent Brain Development Argues Against Teen Executions, 38 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 8 
(2003) (the instinctual part of the brain develops first, and areas such as the frontal cortex that help to 
control emotions develop later).  
 48. Yang Wang et al., One Week of Video Game Play Alters Prefrontal Activity (Dec. 2, 2011) 
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The study concluded that just one week of violent video game play altered 
prefrontal brain activity.
49
 Additional research is underway among media 
effects and brain research experts to strengthen the causal relationship 
between violent video game consumption and the creation of 
dysfunctional cognitive associations.
50
 Scientific proof of direct, unhealthy 
changes to children‘s brains caused by violent video games will likely be 
available shortly, as the research is expanding rapidly.  
Video games are addictive, especially for children. Research in the last 
year has demonstrated similar brain activation patterns between ―video 
game addiction‖ and drug addiction.51 Parents of violent video game 
connoisseurs often express concern about the addictive nature of the 
games.
52
 Children and adolescents (as well as some adults) are known to 
revolve their lives around playing the games, which have been called as 
addictive as cocaine.
53
 Children become entranced in the games, play for 
hours without a break, and become enraged when they are interrupted.
54
 
 
 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Dept. of Radiology and Imaging Scis., Dept. of Psychiatry, Ind. 
Univ. School of Med. and author).  
 49. Id.  
 50. For example, Kira Bailey of Iowa State University‘s Center for the Study of Violence is 
currently conducting an experimental training study that might result in stronger evidence of a causal 
change in brain function resulting from playing violent video games. See Kira Bailey et al., The 
Association Between Chronic Exposure to Video Game Violence and Affective Picture Processing: An 
ERP Study, 11 COGNATIVE AFFECT BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 259 (2011). 
 51. See, e.g., Doug Hyun Han et al., Brain Activity and Desire for Internet Video Game Play, 52 
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 88 (2011); Doug Hyun Han et al., Buproprion Sustained Release 
Treatment Decreases Craving for Video Games and Cue-Induced Brain Activity in Patients with 
Internet Video Game Addiction, 18 EXPERIMENTAL AND CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 297 
(2010); Ju-Yu Yen et al., Psychiatric Symptoms in Adolescents with Internet Addiction: Comparison 
with Substance Abuse, 62 PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 9 (2008).  
 52. The author has personally witnessed these effects and has discussed children‘s reactions to 
video game deprivation with numerous parents, including that the reactions mimick addicts‘ reactions 
to being deprived of drugs, i.e., panic, anger, irritability and promises of behavioral change to regain 
access to the video games. 
 53. Some doctors have concluded that video gaming is ―taking over the lives of kids,‖ and may 
cause a ―clinical impulse control disorder,‖ an addiction akin to compulsive gambling. Sherry Rauh, 
Video Game Addiction No Fun, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/features/video-game-
addiction-no-fun (last visited May 9, 2012). Dr. Young, for example, likens video game addiction to 
cocaine addiction in that the video game addict seeks to change the way he feels by escaping into a 
―fantasy world,‖ as opposed to ingesting a drug. Id. This lure of fantasy is most prominent in role-
playing video games, as a child can become dominant in the game regardless of his social life in the 
real world, making the virtual world more appealing than the real world. Id. Psychiatrist Michael 
Brody defined addiction, including addictive behavior, by the following criteria: ―1) the person needs 
more and more of a substance or behavior to keep him going; 2) if the person does not get more of the 
substance or behavior, he becomes irritable and miserable.‖ Id. 
 54. See Ken Hoffman, supra note 19; see also Bavelier et al., supra note 13, at 765–66 (the video 
game player‘s behaviors indicating addiction, such as ―irritable, aggressive, and violent‖ responses to 
requests to stop playing the games, are similar to behaviors of substance abuse addicts). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/1
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Childcare professionals have begun to advise parents on how to deal with 
children‘s video game addiction,55 which can produce neurological and 
other health problems for children.
56
 In 2007, the American Psychiatric 
Association issued a statement addressing the problem of children‘s video 
game addiction and explained why an official diagnosis of ―video game 
addiction‖ was proposed in the 2012 draft of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V).
57
 Any such addiction is even more 
concerning for children because Congressional findings indicate that 
minors become addicted (to drugs) more easily than adults and have more 
trouble breaking drug addictions.
58
 Considering that addiction has mental 
processing characteristics, children are probably more easily addicted to 
video games than adults.  
In sum, numerous serious risks to mental health can result from 
exposure to violent video games due to their cognitive programming 
potential. Children and adolescents are acutely vulnerable to these risks 
because their brains are still developing.  
 
 
 55. The American Psychiatric Association issued the following statement on June 25, 2007:  
Psychiatrists are concerned about the well-being of children who spend so much time with 
video games that they fail to develop friendships, get appropriate outdoor exercise or suffer in 
their schoolwork. Certainly a child who spends an excessive amount of time playing video 
games may be exposed to violence and may be at higher risks for behavioral and other health 
problems.  
American Psychiatric Association Considers „Video Game Addiction,‟ SCIENCEDAILY (June 25, 2007), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/06/070625133354.htm. 
 56. Telephone Interview with Craig Anderson, supra note 44.  
 57. Professor Anderson stated: 
Today (June 25, 2007) the APA released the following statement on ‗video game addiction‘: 
The APA defines mental disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders. Since the current edition, DSM-IV-TR, does not list ‗video game addiction,‘ the 
APA does not consider ‗video game addiction‘ to be a mental disorder at this time. If the 
science warrants it, this proposed disorder will be considered for inclusion in DSM-V, which 
is due to be published in 2012. Revising DSM requires a years-long, rigorous process—one 
that is transparent and open to suggestions from our colleagues in the medical and mental 
health communities and the public. All changes to DSM will be based on the latest and best 
science. To date, the APA has named the chair and co-chair of the DSM-V Task Force—
David Kupfer, M.D., and Darrel Regier, M.D., M.P.H., respectively—and is in the process of 
establishing the full task force, which will have overall responsibility for DSM-V‘s 
development.  
Id.; see also Sherry Rauh, supra note 53 (video game addiction is ―absolutely‖ real, a ―clinical impulse 
control disorder.‖). The DSM-V will be published in May, 2013.  
 58. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (noting that ―[d]rug abuse can cause severe 
and permanent damage to the health and well-being of young people.‖). 
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II. SOCIAL GOALS OF TORT REGULATION & MANIFESTATIONS OF 
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMBALANCE 
[E]xisting understandings of the First Amendment are based on the 
assumption that, because a price must be paid for free speech, it 
must be the victims of harmful speech who are to pay it. . . . It ought 
to be troubling whenever the cost of a general societal benefit must 
be borne exclusively or disproportionately by a small subset of the 
beneficiaries.
59
 
This Part considers fundamental tort policies in relation to the unique 
circumstances surrounding the video game industry‘s power to determine 
the violence ratings of its own games in conjunction with the industry‘s 
known marketing strategies relative to child consumers. This Part 
concludes that tort immunity for unreasonably dangerous speech is unduly 
favorable to negligent speech producers and inefficiently shifts all costs of 
negligent speech onto the public at large. This tort immunity has created 
an imbalance of rights that is counterproductive to the social goals 
advanced by tort liability. Jurisprudential reform is warranted. 
Tort jurisprudence establishes minimal civic duties to avoid harming 
others by punishing breaches of such duties with money damages and 
other remedies. Tort doctrine relies on the ―rational actor assumption,‖60 
i.e., people seek to maximize their wealth and best interests and respond 
accordingly to behavioral incentives and disincentives.
61
 Economic theory 
has been a driving force behind tort law‘s evolution over the last half 
century and posits that taxing socially harmful behavior through tort 
liability will encourage members of society to exercise care to avoid 
harming others, and that externalized costs will be ignored.
62
 The greatest 
reform to tort jurisprudence over the last century has been the advent of 
strict products liability, and more generally, a focus on enterprise liability 
as opposed to the fault principle.
63
 Contemporary tort policy is 
 
 
 59. Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1322–23 (1992) 
(arguing that free speech jurisprudence is too deferential to speakers and disregards tort policy).  
 60. See, e.g., Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 
115, 123 (1993) (suggesting that ―clear, understandable‖ legal standards are important to encourage 
people to modify their behavior).  
 61. This is known as ―rational choice theory.‖ See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law 
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1051, 1055, 1060–66 (2000).  
 62. See id. at 1054; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 
951 (1996).  
 63. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 969–77 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
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characterized by legal rules that seek to minimize the costs of accidents by 
shifting the costs of harm to the cheapest cost-avoider and to assure 
compensation to injured parties.
64
 Tort liability sends an important 
normative message that disregarding the rights and safety of others is 
socially unacceptable. 
The video game industry brings in more than $16 billion dollars each 
year, and video game producers are extremely wealthy companies.
65
 For 
example, Activision Blizzard, Inc. owns and publishes the Call of Duty 
series of video games, including Modern Warfare 2, which was the best-
selling video game in 2009,
66
 and sold 4.7 million copies within the first 
24 hours of its release—or $310 million in sales.67 Modern Warfare 3 was 
released on November 8, 2011, and blew away all prior video game sales 
statistics: 6.5 million copies of the game were sold in the first 24 hours of 
its release, which constituted an estimated $400 million in sales; after the 
 
 
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 536 (5th ed. 1984) (―[T]he last hundred years have 
witnessed the overthrow of the doctrine of ‗never any liability without fault,‘ even in the legal sense of 
a departure from reasonable standards of conduct.‖). However, a ―critical mass‖ of scholars oppose 
strict products liability and the 1998 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY drops all 
references to ―strict products liability‖ and retains strict liability relative to product flaws only, 
requiring negligence to recover for design and warning defects. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS at 977. 
Strict liability arguably rivals the fault principle as a theory of tort liability. See Gregory C. Keating, 
The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1286 
(2001) (challenging the Third Restatement‘s claim that strict liability is a set of isolated exceptions to 
the fault principle and arguing that the concept of tort liability grounded in strict liability is as general 
as the fault principle). 
 64. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 61, at 1055 (legal academic thought is permeated 
with, and most influenced by, the concern of law and economics and how actors respond to legal 
incentives); DOBBS, supra note 63, at 975; KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, at 20–26.  
 65. This is according to the NPD Group, a market research firm that tracks point-of-sale data on 
many industries such as fashion, electronics, and video games from participating retailers and surveys 
NPD Group‘s panel of 2.5 million consumers. Press Release, The NPD Group, Inc., 2011 Total 
Consumer Spend On All Games Content In The U.S. Estimated Between $16.3 To $16.6 Billion (Jan. 
12, 2012), https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/pressreleases/pr_120116/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K 
8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g3b1NTS98QY0ML5yBnA09TY8cQF6cgo2APA_1I_SjjeBc3Sw8PN
28TQ4sgSwsDT1d_QxfPoAAjC0sj_YLsQEUA36R2cQ!!/; see also Barbara Ortutay, June Video 
Game Sales Decline Again, NPD Says, PHYSORG (July 16, 2010), http://www.physorg.com/news 
198473724.html (despite declines in sales of video games, the industry could still pull in twenty billion 
in 2010); Daniel Terdiman, Video Game Sales Explode in Industry‟s Best Month Ever, CNET (Jan. 14, 
2010, 4:18 PM PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13772_3-10435516-52.html (in 2009, the video game 
industry ―posted total sales of $19.66 billion‖). 
 66. Press Release, NDP Group, 2009 Video Game Software Sales Across Top Global Markets 
Experience Declines for Console and Portable Platforms (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.npd 
.com/press/releases/press_100203a.html. 
 67. See Robert Johnson, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 Destroys Records in First Day Sales 
Rampage, Pulls in $310M, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/money/ 
2009/11/13/2009-11-13_video_game_blitz.html; Tom Ingham, Call Of Duty Series Rops 55 Million 
Sales, MCV (Nov. 27, 2009, 1:13 PM), http://www.mcvuk.com/news/36680/Call-Of-Duty-series-tops-
55-million-sales. 
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first five days of the game‘s release, the sales figure rose to $775 million.68 
Activision
69
 has reaped approximately $3 billion in sales for the Call of 
Duty game series alone and owns other popular video game products, such 
as the Tony Hawk, Spider-Man, and James Bond series. Activision was 
one of dozens of merchants that filed amicus curiae briefs in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n, and has a financial interest in maximizing 
its profits, including maximizing sales of violent video games to children.  
The video game industry ―self-regulates‖ through the Entertainment 
Software Rating Board.
70
 The industry purports to protect children from 
dangerous content by rating games with ―intense violence‖ as ―M‖ for 
mature players, based upon their conclusion that ―M‖ games contain 
―content suitable only for persons ages 17 and older.‖71 However, a 
Federal Trade Commission investigation found in 2000 that the video 
game industry and other entertainment media engage in ―pervasive and 
aggressive marketing of violent movies, music and electronic games‖ to 
children and ―routinely target children under 17 as the audience for 
movies, music and games that their own rating or labeling systems say are 
inappropriate for children . . . due to their violent content.‖72 Ten out of the 
eleven violent video game producers that were investigated specifically 
targeted twelve-to-seventeen-year-old boys for their ―M‖ game 
advertisements to maximize sales and profits.
73
  
The attitude that some violent video game producers have shown 
toward child consumers of ―M‖ games underscores the depth of the 
disregard for children‘s safety and well-being. One video game producer‘s 
marketing plan even stated:  
[W]e recommend approaching the middle segment of this group [6-
34 year olds] because: [The game] has an M rating, which 1) may 
discourage parents from buying the game, and 2) hinder clearance 
of a commercial airing in shows primarily for children under 12. 
 
 
 68. Ben Fritz, Call of Duty: Modern Warefare 3 Grosses $400 Million on First Day, L.A. TIMES 
BLOG (Nov. 11, 2011, 10:38 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2011/11/ 
new-call-of-duty-game-sells-400-million-on-first-day.html; see also Brett Molina, „Modern Warfare 3‟ 
Grosses $775 Million in First 5 Days, USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 2011, http://content.usatoday.com/ 
communities/gamehunters/post/2011/11/call-of-duty-modern-warfare-3-five-day-sales-record/1. 
 69. Activision owns the Call of Duty series and merged with Vivendi Games in 2008 to form the 
―world‘s largest and most subtle pure-play video game publisher.‖ See Activision Blizzard, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Activision_Blizzard (last visited May 9, 2012). 
 70. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM‘N, supra note 12, at 36–44.  
 71. Id. at 38 n.203. 
 72. Id. at i.  
 73. Id. at 44–47. Some retailers, such as Best Buy, have adopted policies to restrict the sale of 
―M‖ video games to minors, but government regulations have been struck down consistently.  
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However, the younger the audience, the more likely they are to be 
influenced by TV advertising . . . . Therefore, the recommended 
media target audience is: Males 12–17—Primary Males 18–34—
Secondary.
74
  
Although some progress in terms of game producers‘ responsibility toward 
children has arguably been made,
75
 it appears that, as a whole, protecting 
children through self-regulation within this enormously wealthy and 
profit-driven industry is failing. 
As explained below, violent video game producers have essentially 
been immunized from tort liability based on rules adopted by lower courts. 
That is, a constitutional right to externalize all social costs of their speech 
has been conferred to producers of potentially life-threatening speech by 
these lower courts. Basic tort principles, such as the rational actor 
assumption, predict that violent media producers will disregard the 
external social harms caused by their media if they are immunized from 
liability for those harms. The fact that violent media producers have 
targeted children in advertising because they are known to be easily 
influenced and manipulated is a predictable outcome of tort immunity 
based on neoclassical economic analysis: the producers are ignoring 
externalized costs and exploiting consumer vulnerability because it 
maximizes their wealth. In essence, some video game producers have 
maximized their products‘ potential social risks to maximize profits, an 
indication that the law has not struck an optimal balance of interests 
between society and violent video game producers.  
A socially optimal speech-tort balance would encourage producers of 
potentially dangerous speech to exercise some degree of social 
responsibility to avoid grave public harm resulting from their speech 
without chilling free speech.
 
An example of how an appropriate threat of 
liability can optimize public safety without chilling free speech may be 
exemplified by the subliminal speech cases. In the early 1990s, two federal 
courts heard cases alleging that subliminal suicide commands embedded in 
rock music caused adolescents to kill themselves.
76
 Both courts held that 
subliminal messages are unprotected speech because they influence people 
 
 
 74. Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
 75. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMM‘N, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: 
A FIFTH FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC RECORDING, 
AND ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES i (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/ 
070412MarketingViolentEChildren.pdf.  
 76. Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp 1144, 1148 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Vance v. Judas Priest, Nos. 
86-5844, 86-3939, 1990 WL 130920 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990).  
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without their conscious awareness and circumvent assumptions underlying 
the ―marketplace of ideas.‖77 Accordingly, both courts held that subliminal 
speech is subject to tort liability. Since these decisions, no published 
opinion has found embedded suicide commands in music, possibly 
because subliminal suicide commands have been discouraged by the threat 
of wrongful death lawsuits. And yet, despite the threat of liability for 
unreasonably dangerous subliminal content, music proliferation has hardly 
been chilled, considering the graphic sexual and violent content of 
contemporary music. While violent video games may be distinguishable 
from subliminal suicide commands in terms of the intent of the producers, 
the point remains that a threat of civil liability can create an incentive for 
media producers to exercise some degree of care to avoid creating 
unreasonable risks of harm to children and society. 
Tort policy and efficient cost-avoidance mitigate toward shifting the 
actual costs of cognizable injury that can be proven to be caused by 
unreasonably dangerous speech onto the speech producers, certainly if 
they are known to be financially capable of absorbing and spreading the 
costs, such as violent video game producers. However, this tort policy 
conflicts with First Amendment policies that speech does not lose 
protection due to its profitability and that free speech must be broadly 
protected.
78
 While striking the ideal speech-tort balance may be difficult, 
this is not a reason to maintain a socially destructive status quo that 
disproportionately harms children. As explained in Part V, an approach to 
speech-tort liability consistent with the Supreme Court‘s speech-tort 
jurisprudence would be superior to the lower courts‘ immunity rules, at 
least relative to certain types of dangerous media and particularly 
vulnerable consumers, such as extremely violent video games and 
children.  
 
 
 77. See Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1148 (subliminal messages are akin to false and misleading 
speech and ―worthy of little, if any, [F]irst [A]mendment constitutional protection.‖); Judas Priest, 
1990 WL 130920 at *25 (subliminal suicide commands are unprotected speech because they operate 
beyond conscious awareness and do not enter the marketplace of ideas). 
 78. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 789 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (―Time and again we have made clear that speech loses none of its 
constitutional protection ‗even though it is carried in a form that is ‗sold‘ for profit.‘‖) (quoting Va. 
Pharm. Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976); see also Brown v. 
Entm‘t Merchs. Ass‘n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (wherein a five-member majority of the Court struck 
down criminal regulation of violent video game sales broadly).  
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III. LOWER COURTS‘ NEGLIGENT SPEECH IMMUNITY RULES 
The plethora of individual rights which we have in this nation of 
free men is undoubtedly a source of our strength, but in a sense, is 
also a source of, or at least the catalyst for, significant lawlessness 
that pervades our society.
79
 
Lower courts have been grappling with negligent speech cases for 
nearly a century, and have virtually barred liability for protected 
dangerous speech on a theory of negligence. Some courts engaged tort 
doctrine to reject liability, but seemed most influenced by free speech 
concerns, and most courts ultimately settled on a categorical approach for 
imposing tort liability on speech, as opposed to engaging the Supreme 
Court‘s general speech-tort balancing framework. Most courts adopted the 
Brandenburg incitement test as an evidentiary predicate to finding 
unreasonably dangerous speech unprotected and therefore subject to tort 
liability. This Part traces the lower courts‘ development of the tort and 
constitutional immunity rules relative to negligent speech. This Part 
concludes that current negligent speech jurisprudence is neither coherent 
nor optimal, and that a constitutionalized negligence paradigm would be 
better. 
A. Lower Courts‟ Tort Analysis of Negligent Speech Liability 
The seminal negligent speech case, Jaillet v. Cushman, employed a 
persuasive risk-utility analysis to find that news publishers owed no duty 
of care to the public at large for merely negligent publication errors that 
led to investment losses,
80
 and several early courts followed this 
reasoning.
81
 However, later courts relied on earlier cases to find that no 
duty of care existed in the context of vastly different analytical variables, 
including the loss of human life.
82
 Although ostensibly analyzing tort 
doctrine, later courts were clearly driven by free speech concerns that 
trumped fundamentals of tort doctrine. Modern courts often rely on a 
 
 
 79. Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 651 F. Supp. 1397, 1402 (W.D. Ark. 1987).  
 80. Jaillet v. Cashman, 115 Misc. 383, 384 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921), aff‟d, 235 N.Y. 511 (N.Y. 
1923). 
 81. See, e.g., MacKown v. Ill. Publ‘g & Printing Co., 6 N.E.2d 526, 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937) 
(extending no duty rule to negligent medical advice published in newspaper, relying on Jaillet v. 
Cashman). 
 82. See infra note 77.  
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constitutional analysis to bar liability for unreasonably dangerous speech, 
which is explained in the next Subpart.  
In Jaillet v. Cashman, the court rejected liability for negligent 
investment reporting based on a traditional risk-utility analysis, finding 
that the value of newsworthy investment reporting outweighed the public 
risk posed by merely negligent publication errors.
83
 The court‘s economic 
analysis produced a ―no-duty‖ rule because publisher liability for authors‘ 
negligence was infeasible, and publishing companies could become 
bankrupt if held liable to an infinite number of plaintiffs. Although the 
First Amendment had not yet been incorporated,
84
 the court denied 
liability to safeguard the public‘s interest in the dissemination of 
newsworthy information. In dicta, the court distinguished categories of 
untrue speech that are not protected from civil liability, deceit, defamation, 
and intentional misreporting.
85
 
Jaillet v. Cashman‘s original no-duty tort rule, which protected news 
publishers from liability based on mere negligence, morphed into 
expansive tort immunity rules to protect book publishers, movie and 
television producers and directors, board and video game manufacturers, 
and Web site owners from a variety of tort claims, even where speech 
foreseeably caused serious injury or death and the plaintiffs alleged 
intentional torts.
86
 Imposing negligence liability on booksellers was 
 
 
 83. In Jaillet v. Cashman, the treasurer of Dow Jones & Company was sued for incorrectly 
reporting in its news service a decision of the Supreme Court regarding the taxable status of stock 
dividends, causing the plaintiff-investor to sell stock in reliance on the false report and to suffer 
economic losses. Jaillet, 115 Misc. at 383. 
 84. The First Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment four years later. See 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). However, constitutional limitations to speech-tort 
liability have been recognized relative to libel as far back as 1802, and early commentators treated 
civil liability the same as criminal punishment relative to constitutional speech and press protection. 
See Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the Freedom of Speech, Press, and 
Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 251 (2010). 
 85. Jaillet, 115 Misc. at 384 (noting that ―the law does not attempt to impose liability for a 
violation of that duty unless it constitutes a breach of contract obligation or trust, or amounts to a 
deceit, libel or slander.‖); accord First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor‘s Co., 670 F. Supp. 
115, 118–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff‟d, 869 F.2d 175, (2d Cir. 1989) (proof of a publisher‘s intent to 
misreport financial data would sustain a tort action); Suarez v. Underwood, 103 Misc. 2d 445, (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1980), aff‟d, 449 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1981) (―actual malice‖ standard applied to newspaper‘s false 
advertisement). 
 86. See, e.g., First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor‘s Corp., 869 F.2d 175, (2d Cir. 1989) 
(―no duty‖ rule extended to negligent investment advice contained in purchased investment news 
letter, relying on Jaillet v. Cashman); MacKown v. Ill. Publ‘g & Printing Co., 6 N.E.2d 526, 530 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1937) (―no duty‖ rule extended to negligent medical advice contained in newspaper, relying 
on Jaillet v. Cashman); Smith v. Linn, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 339, 351–52 (C.P. Montgomery Cnty. 1988) 
(―no duty‖ rule extended to negligent diet book that caused death of dieter, relying on Jaillet v. 
Cashman); see also Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 921, 923 (E.D. La. 1987) (―no 
duty in tort exists for a newspaper publisher to investigate its advertisers for the correctness of the ads 
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rejected early on as an unjustified form of strict liability, considering that 
booksellers cannot possibly ―evaluate the thought processes of the many 
authors and publishers of the hundreds and often thousands of books 
which the merchant offers for sale,‖ and to hold booksellers liable ―would 
severely restrict the flow of the ideas they distribute.‖87 Some early courts 
recognized that authors are cheaper cost-avoiders, such that any duty of 
 
 
placed in the publication . . . .‖); Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 990, 991, 995 
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (publisher of The Merck Index, which contained information about the toxicity of 
drugs and chemicals, owed no duty of care to plaintiff manufacturer of drug that was incorrectly 
labeled as toxic, causing sales losses); Sexton v. The Am. News Co., 133 F. Supp. 591 (N.D. Fla. 
1955) (newspaper not liable for unintentional defamatory publication); Walters v. Seventeen 
Magazine, 241 Cal. Rptr. 101, 102–03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (magazine not liable to a minor who 
suffered ―toxic shock syndrome‖ from using Playtex tampons which were advertised in the magazine); 
Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 236 (Fla. 1933) (newspaper not liable for mere reproduction of 
allegedly defamatory content without proof of fault); Birmingham v. Fodor‘s Travel Publ‘ns, Inc., 833 
P.2d 70, 75, 82 (Haw. 1992) (publisher of travel guides who neither authored the guide nor expressly 
guaranteed its accuracy had no duty to warn of inaccuracies in content regarding safety of beaches); 
MacKown, 6 N.E.2d at 530 (―negligent words are not actionable unless they are uttered directly, with 
knowledge or notice that they will be acted on, to one to whom the speaker is bound by some relation 
of duty, arising out of public calling, contract or otherwise, to act with care if he acts at all.‖ (quoting 
Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & S.B. Co. 245 N.Y. 377, 381 (N.Y. 1927))); Yudas v. Mudge, 322 
A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974) (Popular Mechanics Magazine held not liable for injuries caused 
by defective fireworks that were advertised in the magazine, since publisher did not ―guarantee, 
warrant, or endorse‖ the product in their section for paid advertisements); Suarez v. Underwood, 426 
N.Y.S. 2d 208, 211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (newspaper not liable for alleged false advertisement in 
absence of proof of scienter on the part of the newspaper). The Jaillet v. Cashman rule required privity 
between the publisher and the plaintiff to sustain a claim, but this has been modified to require a 
―special relationship,‖ considering that privity requirements have relaxed generally. See Daniel v. Dow 
Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987) (―The ‗special relationship‘ limitation on liability 
for negligent statements remains despite the weakening of the rule of privity.‖). 
 87. Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056–57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (denying liability 
against the seller of a recipe book that failed to warn that an ingredient—the Dasheen plant, also 
known as ―elephant‘s ears‖—was poisonous if consumed raw, to avoid imposing strict liability on 
booksellers); see also Winter v. G.P. Putnam‘s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991) (no 
liability for publication Encyclopedia of Mushrooms that described poisonous mushrooms as safe to 
eat, causing plaintiffs‘ liver transplants); Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 
1988) (publisher of nursing book containing dangerous medical treatment advice held not liable for 
negligent publication); Lewin v. McCreight & Davis Publ‘ns, 655 F. Supp. 282, 283 (E.D. Mich. 
1987) (publisher of ―how to‖ book, The Complete Metalsmith, held not liable for allegedly negligent 
mixing instructions that caused an explosion); Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 
1264, 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (liability denied where injured woodcarver sued publisher of a 
woodcarving ―how to‖ book for negligent misrepresentation); Smith v. Linn, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 339, 
351 (C.P. Montgomery Cnty. 1988) (publisher of allegedly dangerous diet book that caused decedent‘s 
death did not have a duty to the general public, engaging a First Amendment cost-benefit analysis 
concerning the value of disseminating ideas). But see, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler, 565 F. Supp. 802, 804 
n.1 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (citing Carter v. Rand McNally & Co., No. 76-1864-F (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 1980) 
(publisher of science book settled for $1.1 Million in suit alleging negligent laboratory instructions that 
caused harm to a minor when the instructions caused a methyl alcohol explosion)); Kercsmar v. Pen 
Argyl Area Sch. Dist., 1 Pa. D. & C.3d 1 (C.P. Northampton Cnty. 1976) (school textbook deemed 
―goods‖ for U.C.C. purposes, and allegation of defect in instructions contained in text of book 
sufficiently plead a breach of implied warranty). 
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care to avoid negligent content should be imposed on authors, not 
publishers.
88
 Later courts, however, conflated authors, publishers, 
producers, distributors, advertisers and others in vertical privity with 
authors, and immunized them to further ―an uninhibited exchange of 
ideas‖89 under express or implicit risk-utility analyses without addressing 
the fact that some of these producers‘ control over content greatly reduced 
their avoidance costs or the fact that they have enormously deep pockets 
and the capacity to spread the costs of harm, which should affect the 
feasibility analysis.
90
  
Jaillet v. Cashman‘s no-duty rule was also extended to cases alleging 
wrongful death, despite the fact that the gravity of injury risked is 
normally a primary variable in risk-utility analysis.
91
 In some cases, 
 
 
 88. That is, authors were not afforded the same immunity as publishers for dangerous mistakes in 
content because authors were in a better position to investigate and foresee harms caused by the 
materials that they created. A few early courts dismissed negligent publication cases against publishers 
but not authors. See, e.g., Alm, 480 N.E.2d at 1263 (complaint dismissed as to the publisher but not 
author). But see Cardozo, 342 So. 2d at 1054 (complaint dismissed as to the author but not bookseller). 
However, where the publisher gives negligent investment advice, courts have found no duty despite 
the fact that the publisher controls content. See, e.g., First Equity, 869 F.2d at 176–77 (―Even the most 
careful preparation will not avoid all errors. The potential for meritless or even fraudulent claims is 
high, and the cost of even successful defenses may be prohibitive if publishers are to be exposed 
. . . .‖); Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 901 (Ohio 1986) (publisher of Wall Street Journal 
not liable to subscriber for non-defamatory negligent misrepresentation regarding a securities 
investment). As one court explained, author liability ―will depend on the nature of the publication, on 
the intended audience, on causation in fact, and on the foreseeability of damage.‖ L.B. Lippincott, 694 
F. Supp. at 1216 (citing Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)). A 
Michigan federal court noted that a publisher could become the cheapest cost-avoider if the publisher 
contributed content to a book, since the ―burden of determining whether the content was accurate 
would be less.‖ Lewin, 655 F. Supp. at 284. The Lewin court noted that if the publisher or its 
employees authored part of the book or if the risk of harm was plainly foreseeable and sufficiently 
severe, such as a book entitled ―How To Make Your Own Parachute,‖ the publisher may bear greater 
responsibility to assure the accuracy of content. Id.  
 89. Smith, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d at 351. The court in Smith stated:  
While acknowledging that certain ideas may be dangerous, unpopular or even harmful, the 
benefits to society in allowing an uninhibited exchange of ideas . . . far outweigh the ills such 
ideas might bear. . . . The fear of liability would eventually chill to a trickle the free flow of 
information so cherished by our society and protected by our constitution. 
Id.; see also Yudas, 322 A.2d at 825 (citations omitted) (―To impose the suggested broad legal duty 
upon publishers of nationally circulated magazines, newspapers and other publications, would not only 
be impractical and unrealistic, but would have a staggering adverse effect on the commercial world 
and our economic system‖ and would ―open the doors to ‗liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.‘‖). 
 90. For example, Activision owns and publishes the Call of Duty video game series and 
presumably is the cheapest cost-avoider because it controls design and content and has access to the 
most information concerning the games, including dangers posed by the games. See supra notes 65–69 
and accompanying text. 
 91. Judge Learned Hand‘s risk-utility balancing test weighed three variables to determine 
whether a duty has been breached: (1) the probability of the harm; (2) the gravity of the harm; (3) the 
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serious injury or death was a clearly foreseeable risk to the publisher, but 
no duty was imposed based on a balancing approach that centered on free 
speech concerns. For example, in Winter v. G. P. Putnam‟s Sons, an 
Encyclopedia of Mushrooms book negligently characterized extremely 
poisonous mushrooms as safe to eat, which caused two wild mushroom 
hunters to eat the mushrooms, necessitating liver transplants for both.
92
 
Despite the obvious risk of death, the court found no duty of care: ―Were 
we tempted to create [a duty of care], the gentle tug of the First 
Amendment and the values embodied therein would remind us of the 
social costs.‖93 
Some courts found no duty of care by focusing on a lack of 
foreseeability, which is required by negligence law. For example, in 
Watters v. TSR, Inc.,
94
 the Sixth Circuit held that the children‘s game 
Dungeons & Dragons
95
 did not create a foreseeable risk of suicide for 
children who played the game, in part because the child‘s suicide was not 
foreseeable to his own mother.
96
 In the same vein, in Way v. Boy Scouts of 
America, the court extended the no duty tort rule to a shooting sports 
supplement contained in a boys‘ magazine that in fact caused the death of 
a twelve-year-old boy.
97
 The court concluded that the boy‘s conduct in 
playing with an old rifle immediately after reading the supplement was not 
foreseeable.
98
 Therefore, neither a duty to warn nor a duty to refrain from 
 
 
burden of taking ―adequate precautions.‖ See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 
(2d Cir. 1947).  
 92. 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991).  
 93. Id. at 1037; see also, e.g., First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor‘s Corp., 670 F. Supp. 
115, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (―unlimited liability‖ for negligent mistakes in published materials would 
have a ―staggering deterrent effect on the dissemination of printed material.‖). 
 94. 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 95. Dungeons and Dragons is a fantasy role-playing game in which players assume a character 
identity to carry out war adventures, and is widely recognized as the beginning of the role-playing 
game industry. See What Is D&D?, WIZARDS OF THE COAST, http://www.wizards.com/default.asp?x= 
dnd/whatisdnd (last visited May 9, 2012).  
 96. 904 F.2d at 381. The court said that even if a duty was breached, suicide is ―highly 
extraordinary‖ and generally constitutes a superseding cause. Id. at 383. The victim was at least 
sixteen years of age, as he shot himself in his car. Id. at 379; see also Telephone Interview with Mark 
Edwards, Sheila Watters‘s attorney of record, Paducah, Ky. (Feb. 8, 2011).  
 97. 856 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Tex. App. 1993).  
 98. Id. at 235–36. Common sense would indicate otherwise, as children are known to want to try 
things they see on television or read about right away. Children‘s relative inability to foresee danger is 
one of the reasons that children are not bound by the general duty of due care in tort law, but rather are 
expected only to exercise the same degree of care as children of like age, intelligence, and experience. 
While a risk-utility analysis may warrant a no duty rule, it seems contrived to find no foreseeability in 
a case such as this. Indeed, the fact that the supplement contained warnings of the dangers of 
unsupervised use of firearms would seem to establish foreseeability. 
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publishing the supplement was owed to the reading public.
99
  
More recently, lawsuits have been filed alleging that adolescents‘ 
considerable consumption of violent media triggered their subsequent 
killing sprees. In two high school mass-shooting cases, victims of 
adolescent-perpetrated mass murder sued producers of violent video 
games and The Basketball Diaries as well as Internet Web sites for 
negligence, strict products liability,
100
 and RICO violations.
101
 Again, 
 
 
 99. Id. at 237. The court engaged Judge Learned Hand‘s risk-utility test and weighed risk, 
forseeability and likelihood of injury against social utility, the costs of preventing injury or harm, and 
the economics of placing the burden on the defendant, but stated that foreseeability is the ―foremost 
and dominant‖ consideration, and disregarded the gravity of the risk or cost allocation based on the 
cost burden. Id. at 234. The court found that plaintiff‘s behavior in locating and playing with the old 
rifle was not foreseeable. ―These circumstances of Rocky‘s death, however, are at odds with the risks 
foreseeably created by the message conveyed by the supplement. Photographs on the cover of the 
supplement emphasize supervision and use of firearms in a structured environment.‖ Id. at 236. The 
Way court also said that risks associated with unsupervised and unsafe use of firearms by children is a 
factor that increases the social utility of the supplement because ―the information contained in the 
supplement promoted safe and responsible use of firearms, and was reasonably calculated to lessen the 
possibility of accidental death caused by a child‘s use of firearms.‖ Id.  
 100. Most courts have found that publications cannot be ―defective‖ for strict products liability 
purposes, as ―products liability law is geared to the tangible world,‖ not intangible ideas. See Winter v. 
G.P. Putnam‘s Sons, 938 F.2d. 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, courts have determined that 
strict liability protects consumers from harms caused by defective tangible properties of books and 
other publications, such as defective binding, but does not protect consumers from negligent content. 
See, e.g., Sanders v. Acclaim Entm‘t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1277–79 (D. Colo. 2002) (products 
liability does not apply to violent video games and other media that allegedly caused teenage 
homicidal shooting spree at high school); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798, 810 (W.D. 
Ky. 2000) (products liability does not apply to violent video games and other media that allegedly 
caused teenage homicidal shooting spree at high school); Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. V–94–
006, 1997 WL 405907, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997) (musical recordings are not products because 
they lack ―physical properties‖); Jones v. L.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988) 
(Section 402A has not been extended to the dissemination of ideas or knowledge in books, and to do 
so would chill free expression); Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) 
(printing and binding are tangible properties of books that are subject to product warranties, but 
intangible properties such as thoughts and ideas expressed in books are not tangible, and are not 
subject to product warranties); Herceg v. Hustler, 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1983) 
(pornographic magazine is not a ―product‖) (citing Cardozo, 342 So. 2d at 1056–67); Way v. Boy 
Scouts of Am., 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App. 1993) (sports shooting supplement is not a ―product‖).  
 101. In James v. Meow Media, fourteen-year-old Michael Carneal took six guns to Heath High 
School on December 1, 1997, and waited for a daily prayer session to end, then shot and killed three 
female members of the prayer group, and wounded five others. 90 F. Supp. 2d at 800, aff‟d, 300 F.3d 
683 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1159 (2003). Police seized Michael‘s computer and found 
that he had consumed large quantities of pornographic, sexually violent, and violent materials. Id. 
Among other things, plaintiffs alleged that the movie, The Basketball Diaries, was a cause of harm 
because it depicts a student who ―graphically massacres his classmates with a shotgun,‖ and the expert 
psychologist testified that Carneal was ―profoundly influenced by his exposure to the above 
violent/pornographic media . . . which tends to glorify violence.‖ Id. Similarly, in Sanders v. Acclaim 
Entm‟t, a case arising out of the Columbine High School tragedy, the court found no duty owed by 
producers of violent media based on a four factor risk-utility analysis, and characterized the teenage 
killers‘ behavior as an ―idiosyncratic reaction‖ that was not sufficiently foreseeable to create a duty of 
care. 188 F. Supp. at 1271–72. The factors are: ―1) foreseeability of the injury or harm that occurred; 
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foreseeability analysis blocked the claims. The plaintiffs argued that 
defendants knew or should have known that violent video games trained 
children to be effective killers and that copycat violence could result from 
minors‘ consumption of their violent media, which created a foreseeable 
and unreasonable risk of harm to the public and an attendant duty of 
care.
102
 However, the courts assumed that preexisting mental instability 
was the true cause of the crimes,
103
 notwithstanding expert testimony that 
violent media can cause minors to become violent and no doubt teaches 
them skills to maximize killing spree casualties.
104
 The courts held that 
creators and publishers of potentially dangerous speech have no duty to 
foresee the mental condition of ―troubled‖ (child and adolescent) 
consumers before marketing their media.
105
  
Courts rejected tort liability even in cases in which it was undisputed 
that producers and theatre owners in fact foresaw youth violence 
immediately following gang movies in the proximity of the theatres that 
showed the films and nonetheless continued to show them, which led to 
additional youth casualties.
106
 These courts seemed to adopt the idea that 
 
 
2) the social utility of Defendants‘ conduct; 3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the 
injury or harm; and 4) the consequences of placing the burden on the Defendants.‖ Id. at 1271. In this 
case, the survivor of a teacher who was shot and killed during the shooting spree at Columbine High 
School sued violent video game makers and movie producers for damages under a variety of tort 
theories, including negligence and strict products liability. Id. at 1268–69. Plaintiffs claimed that 
violent videos, and particularly the high school mass-murder scene from The Basketball Diaries, 
influenced the two students inexplicably to gun down a teacher and classmates in cold blood. Id. 
Students‘ use of violent video games probably prepared them to kill efficiently and effectively. See id. 
at 1273.  
 102. See, e.g., Meow Media, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 801–02.  
 103. See id. at 805–06. The Sixth Circuit in Meow Media specifically found that the ―glacial 
process of [violent] personality development is far from the temporal imminence that we have required 
to satisfy the Brandenburg test.‖ 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002). The court was referring to social 
science reports that children exposed to violent media develop violent tendencies and/or become 
desensitized to violence in a slow and gradual way. See supra Part I.A. 
 104. If the casualties at Columbine High School would not have been killed but for the murderers‘ 
efficiency in killing, gained through training provided by violent video games, cause-in-fact exists. 
This is a jury question that probably requires expert witness testimony. 
 105. See Meow Media, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 803–04 (citing Watters v. T.S.R., Inc., 904 F.2d 378 (6th 
Cir. 1990). Despite implicitly accepting causation between exposure to violence and suicidal or 
homicidal reactions, particularly among children and youth, some courts chose to characterize the 
persons reacting with violence as ―emotionally troubled,‖ ―mentally fragile,‖ or otherwise aberrational, 
such that their violent reactions were not foreseeable even if in fact ―caused‖ by violent media. See 
Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1990) (children‘s game did not create foreseeable 
risk of suicide for children who were ―mentally fragile‖); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 
536 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Mass. 1989) (citing McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 197 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1988)) (holding that producing a violent gang movie did not create a duty of care to prevent 
aggressive responses of ―emotionally troubled individuals‖). 
 106. See, e.g., Bill v. Super. Ct., 187 Cal. Rptr. 625, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding no liability 
against a film producer for a shooting that occurred near the theatre that showed the movie, despite 
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behaviors of emotionally troubled adolescents cannot be attributed to film 
distributors, and the only way to protect society from the effects of violent 
speech would be to ―police‖ speech to the point where only the most bland 
and least controversial speech would be produced.
107
 In these and other 
cases, free speech concerns clearly trumped tort principles, and negligence 
liability was rejected entirely as opposed to reconciling competing tort and 
constitutional policies.  
A few courts have allowed negligence-based liability for speech or 
published ―products‖ based purely on a tort analysis with little or no 
mention of the First Amendment. For example, in Hanberry v. Hearst 
Corp., a California court of appeals found a magazine publisher liable for 
endorsing a dangerous product with its ―Consumer Guaranty,‖ which 
aligned the publisher with the product manufacturer and created a duty of 
care toward consumers.
108
 In 1975, the California Supreme Court imposed 
negligence liability on a radio broadcaster for promotional speech that 
encouraged teenage drivers to race to various locations on city streets to 
receive prizes, resulting in a motorist‘s death.109 That case was not 
followed and was later characterized as an incitement case.
110
 Other courts 
have held that mass-produced and marketed navigation maps are 
 
 
foreseeability); Yakubowicz, 536 N.E.2d at 1071–72 (holding that producing a violent gang movie did 
not create a duty of care to prevent aggressive responses of ―emotionally troubled persons‖). In 
Yakubowicz, plaintiff established that the movie‘s producers and distributors had actual knowledge that 
the movie caused violent audience reactions previously in Boston and California and that Paramount 
executives released the film during spring vacation week to maximize attendance by high-school-aged 
kids. Yakubowicz, 536 N.E.2d at 1069. Two youths had been killed near theatres showing ―The 
Warriors‖ in Palm Springs and Oxnard, California. Id. The court held that Paramount owed a duty of 
care to the public, but that the movie did not fall within an exception to the First Amendment‘s 
protection because the movie did not ―purport to order or command anyone to any concrete action at 
any specific time, much less immediately,‖ so it could not be characterized as ―incitement‖ even if it in 
fact have a tendency to lead to violence. Id. at 1071 (quoting McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 
187, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that Ozzy Osbourne and his agents did not owe a duty of care 
to music listeners who committed suicide)). 
 107. See Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. V–94–006, 1997 WL 405907, at *12–13 (S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 31, 1997) (music lyrics describing shooting a cop did not create a foreseeable risk of a criminal 
actually shooting a cop in a similar manner) (citing McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 197 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988)).  
 108. See Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (Good 
Housekeeping magazine went beyond the role of mere publisher by giving a defective product its 
―Consumer Guaranty‖ seal of approval, thereby creating a duty of care to consumers of the endorsed 
product). In Hanberry, the First Amendment was not mentioned. 
 109. Weirum et al. v. R.K.O. Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975). 
 110. Id. Regarding the First Amendment, the court stated simply that ―[t]he First Amendment does 
not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than act.‖ Id. at 
40; see also, e.g., Smith v. Linn, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 339, 349 (C.P. Montgomery Cnty. 1988) (―The 
Weirum decision . . . seems to suggest the radio station‘s activity constituted incitement, thus falling 
outside First Amendment protection.‖).  
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―products‖ subject to strict liability where factually verifiable data, such as 
the location of mountains, were negligently not depicted on the maps, 
leading to plane crashes and casualties.
111
 None of these cases analyzed 
First Amendment limits to speech liability,
112
 and the products liability 
analysis has been limited to navigation maps.
113
 A murder instruction 
manual was found to be a criminal ―speech act,‖ and therefore unprotected 
speech subject to tort liability.
114
 Murder-for-hire advertisements have 
subjected a magazine publisher to a constitutionalized form of negligence 
liability, as they are commercial in nature, less protected, and quite 
foreseeably led to murder.
115
 Other than these few disjointed exceptions, 
courts have not allowed negligence liability for protected speech. 
In sum, lower courts‘ speech-tort jurisprudence grounded in tort 
doctrine virtually bars tort liability for negligent speech and has effectively 
immunized producers of violent entertainment media, including violent 
video games. While Jaillet v. Cashman seems correct based on a risk-
utility analysis, the high school shooting cases seem different, at least 
relative to the video game defendants, considering their incredible wealth, 
 
 
 111. See, e.g., Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 791 (D. Conn. 1982) (map that 
contained an inaccurate depiction of landing site was a ―product‖ under Section 402A because pilots 
rely on the maps and plane crashes and human death are a foreseeable result of inaccurate depictions) 
(citing KMart v. Midcon Realty Group of Conn., 489 F. Supp. 813, 818 (D. Conn. 1980) and 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. c, f (1965)). The Second Circuit affirmed, finding 
that the chart producer, Jeppesen:  
[U]ndertook a special responsibility, as seller, to insure that consumers will not be injured by 
the use of the charts; Jeppesen is entitled—and encouraged—to treat the burden of accidental 
injury as a cost of production . . . . This special responsibility lies upon Jeppesen in its role as 
designer, seller and manufacturer.  
Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). Other courts 
followed this reasoning relative to maps and charts, based on strict products liability‘s purpose of 
safeguarding the public from risks posed by mass-produced items and its cost-spreading function. See 
Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (Jeppesen was strictly liable 
for an airplane crash where its chart failed to designate a hill that the plane struck during a night 
landing; the concept that strict liability principles apply only to products‘ ―physical properties‖ was 
―clearly erroneous‖); see also Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295–97 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(defective chart causing plane crash was a defective product for purposes of analysis under Section 
402A, and no fault was required to impose liability) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 402A cmt. c (1965) (noting that manufacturers of mass-produced products are the cheapest cost-
avoiders, can afford the costs, and should consider the costs of accidents a cost of doing business)). 
None of these cases addressed the First Amendment.  
 112. In Brocklesby, Jeppesen raised the First Amendment defense for the first time on appeal, so 
the court did not consider it. 767 F.2d at 1295 n.9; see also supra notes 92–93. 
 113. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 (1998) (―a product is 
tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or consumption.‖); see also id. at cmt. d 
(discussing ―intangible personal property‖). 
 114. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).  
 115. See, e.g., Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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the nature of the video games‘ effects on children‘s brains, and the level of 
foreseeability and culpability of the defendants in targeting pre-teens and 
teenagers for games that they recognize as inappropriate for them. Factors 
such as foreseeability of intervening crimes and feasibility should weigh 
into a tort analysis, but by dismissing the cases on tort principles, courts 
have avoided the more difficult constitutional analysis.
116
 
B. Lower Courts‟ Constitutional Analysis of Negligent Speech Liability  
During the same period that some courts dismissed negligence speech 
cases under a tort analysis, many courts engaged a constitutional analysis 
grounded in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire‘s categorical approach to 
criminal regulation of allegedly dangerous, subversive, or anger-provoking 
speech. That is, instead of engaging the Supreme Court‘s speech-tort 
balancing framework, these courts relied on the Court‘s criminal 
categorical approach to punishing political or ideological speech, which 
requires a finding that the speech falls within a category of unprotected 
speech before it may be punished. Today, the nearly unanimous lower 
court rule subjects allegedly unreasonably dangerous speech of all sorts, 
including mass-produced video games, to Brandenburg‘s incitement test 
as a predicate to imposing tort liability.  
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
117
 the Court identified categories of 
speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment and therefore subject 
to criminal punishment, to wit: the lewd and obscene, the profane, the 
libelous, and the insulting or ―fighting words,‖ such as the ―offensive‖ or 
―derisive‖ words that led to Mr. Chaplinsky‘s criminal conviction.118 In 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court considerably strengthened protection for 
the type of live political speech at issue in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 
The Brandenburg Court adopted a stringent ―incitement‖ test to render 
 
 
 116. See, e.g., Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1990) (since Kentucky tort law 
resolved the liability issue, constitutional issues should not be addressed); James v. Meow Media, 90 
F. Supp. 2d 798, 818 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936)) 
(finding constitutional analysis unnecessary if a case can be resolved on tort grounds)).  
 117. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 118. The Chaplinsky Court reasoned:  
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These 
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‗fighting‘ 
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that 
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 
Id. at 571–72. 
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political or ideological speech highly protected from government 
punishment absent proof of the speaker‘s intent to risk public safety and a 
likelihood of imminent public harm.
119
  
Within a few years of Brandenburg, the first lawsuits alleging that 
violent media negligently caused harm to children were filed. The lower 
courts adopted a Chaplinsky-based categorical approach to negligent 
speech-tort cases, relying on incitement analysis. During this same period, 
the Court began to recognize that state tort law punishing defamation is 
state action and subject to First Amendment restrictions. In the seminal 
defamation case, New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court balanced free 
speech rights against the values furthered by tort liability and denied 
liability for untrue, defamatory political speech.
120
 Yet, the Court has 
allowed tort liability for publishing presumably true political memoirs, 
depending on a number of policy considerations.
121
 As explained in Part 
IV, the Court generally balances a number of factors when considering tort 
liability for speech, then constitutionalizes tort liability for speech by 
raising the burden of proof necessary to establish a prima facie tort case to 
reconcile tort liability with the First Amendment.
122
 
Ten years after Brandenburg was decided, one of the earliest federal 
lawsuits alleging negligent broadcasting was filed. In Zamora v. CBS, a 
minor who shot and killed his eighty-three-year-old neighbor sued the 
major television broadcasters for damages, claiming that from ages five to 
fifteen, he was ―impermissibly stimulated, incited and instigated‖ to 
commit violent crimes he viewed on television.
123
 The Florida court held 
 
 
 119. The Brandenburg test requires intent. The First Amendment does ―not permit a State to 
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.‖ Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curium). Brandenburg essentially 
reformulated Schenk‘s ―clear and present‖ danger test to require speech to ―incite‖ imminent 
lawlessness to lose First Amendment protection from criminal sanctions. Id. at 449. Brandenburg‘s 
incitement test was tightened in Hess v. Indiana, which reversed a disorderly conduct conviction and 
raised the bar to establishing incitement. 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973); see also Brown v. Entn‘t Merchs. 
Ass‘n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (upon finding that violence has never been a category of 
unprotected speech, the majority applied strict scrutiny to a sales regulation of violent video games and 
struck down the sales regulation).  
 120. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (false statements of fact were 
shielded from defamation liability to give ―breathing space‖ for criticism of public officials). 
 121. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (tort liability 
allowed for misappropriation of former President Gerald Ford‘s Watergate memoirs).  
 122. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court began what became a series of cases 
constitutionalizing torts to reconcile liability for speech with First Amendment limit so punishing 
speech. See infra Part IV. 
 123. 480 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Fla. 1979). Plaintiffs claimed that violent broadcasts caused him 
to become desensitized to violence, to develop a sociopathic personality, and to become a ―danger to 
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that the Constitution fully protects speech from negligence liability unless 
the speech falls within a category of unprotected speech, based on the 
public‘s right to receive ―suitable access to political, esthetic, moral and 
other ideas‖ through broadcasting.124 The court reviewed the existing 
categories of unprotected speech identified in Chaplinsky, then dismissed 
the case upon a finding that the speech did not fit within a recognized 
category of unprotected speech.
125
  
A few years later, a California appellate court decided Olivia N. v. 
NBC.
126
 The evidence established that a nine-year-old girl‘s rapists had 
recently seen the movie Born Innocent and conspired to reenact an 
artificial rape scene from the movie, and that NBC knew that depicting 
crimes against children could lead to ―copycat‖ crimes against children.127 
Although the copycat crime was foreseeable, the court held that the 
broadcast did not constitute ―incitement,‖128 and the First Amendment 
precluded tort liability on a ―simple negligence‖ theory.129  
Soon after Olivia N., the Fifth Circuit handed down Herceg v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc.
130
 In this case, the teenage decedent‘s family sued Hustler 
Magazine for negligence and strict liability after it published ―Orgasm of 
Death,‖ an ―inflammatory‖ article that described in detail how to 
experience ―autoerotic asphyxiation,‖ and which led to the accidental 
hanging death of a fourteen-year-old Texas boy when he tried it at home. 
The jury found incitement and awarded damages,
131
 but the Fifth Circuit 
reversed over a strong dissent, finding that, despite clear cause-in-fact and 
foreseeability,
132
 the article did not ―incite‖ the boy‘s sexual behavior as a 
 
 
himself and others.‖ Id. at 200–01. 
 124. Id. at 205 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).  
 125. Id. at 204–07.  
 126. 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982). 
 127. Id. at 891. 
 128. Id. at 892. It seems clear that NBC did not advocate or intend to cause harm and was, at most, 
negligent in deciding to broadcast the film.  
 129. Id. Twice the court referred to the impropriety of allowing liability on a ―simple negligence 
theory.‖ Id. at 892, 894; see also, e.g., DeFilippo v. NBC, 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982) (television 
broadcaster not liable to parents of a child who died while performing a stunt he had seen on 
television).  
 130. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 
(1988).  
 131. The jury awarded $182,000 in damages. 
 132. The magazine, opened to the page of ―Orgasm of Death,‖ was lying near the feet of the dead 
boy, who had obviously been following the instructions in the magazine when he hanged himself to 
death. The fact that the danger was foreseeable is established by the title itself, although the court 
seemed to think that the numerous warnings contained in the article undermined plaintiffs‘ argument 
that the article incited, or even advocated, trying the sex act at home. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987).  
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matter of law, and therefore, Hustler was immune from civil liability.
133
  
In the 1980s and 1990s, numerous extremely violent movies, songs, 
games, and other mass-produced speech products entered the stream of 
commerce, perhaps a predictable result of early courts‘ tort and 
constitutional immunity rules. Numerous lawsuits followed. In the legal 
proceedings following the Columbine High School tragedy, a federal court 
addressed the First Amendment‘s protection of violent media, stating that 
―works of imagination . . . significantly contribute[] to social utility . . . . 
[V]iolence has always been and remains a central interest of humankind 
and a recurrent, even obsessive theme of culture both high and low,‖ 
warranting full First Amendment protection for violent media.
134
 In 
response to plaintiffs‘ argument that greater government regulation is 
appropriate to safeguard impressionable minors from violent influences, 
the court held that the Brandenburg incitement test applies to speech that 
harms minor plaintiffs just as it applies to adults.
135
  
Similar to the development of the tort-based immunity rules, the early 
constitutional cases seem more defensible than the high school shooting 
cases. Zamora v. CBS, for example, had enormous causation issues that 
rendered liability against the broadcaster a true threat to broadcasting 
prerogative. The film at issue in Olivia N. v. NBC brought considerable 
public awareness to the gross abuses taking place in homes for troubled 
adolescents, and educational programming surely must be a primary free 
speech concern, which seems to outweigh the risk of copycat crimes. 
Herceg v. Hustler seems different, as it involved a step-by-step sex article 
on how to achieve an orgasmic high in a very dangerous manner, 
rendering foreseeability clear and causation direct.
136
 The high school 
 
 
 133. Id. at 1024–25. Judge Edith H. Jones filed a strong dissenting opinion from the majority‘s 
categorical approach, arguing that the pornographic and commercial nature of the publication rendered 
it worthy of less strict First Amendment protection under Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 1028. Judge 
Jones wrote that ―Hustler is a profitable commercial enterprise trading on its prurient appeal to a small 
portion of the population. It deliberately borders on technical obscenity, which would be wholly 
unprotected . . . .‖ Id.  
 134. Sanders v. Acclaim Entm‘t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1273–74 (D. Colo. 2002) (quoting in 
part Am. Amusement Mach. Ass‘n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d. 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 994 (2001)). 
 135. Id. at 1281. The court seemed confused about the distinction between ―strict scrutiny‖ as the 
test for challenges to legislative deprivations of constitutional rights and the balancing test the Court 
had utilized in speech-tort cases. The court seemed to assume that the Brandenburg incitement test 
constitutes ―strict scrutiny‖ in negligence cases whereas actual malice constitutes ―strict scrutiny‖ in 
defamation cases.  
 136. The boy was found hanging dead with a copy of the magazine beneath his feet, opened to the 
page explaining how to achieve a dangerous orgasm in an article titled, ―Orgasm of Death.‖ See 
Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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shooting cases also seem different, as some of the ―speech‖ consisted of 
mass-marketed games that teach effective and organized killing skills and 
reward acts of aggression just like the acts perpetrated by the effectively 
trained teenage killers—a far cry from the type of live political speech at 
issue in Chaplinsky or Brandenburg. Nonetheless, lower courts have 
lumped very different types of negligent speech cases together and applied 
the Brandenburg incitement test to nearly all cases in which negligent 
speech allegedly caused serious injury or death. 
Some plaintiffs attempted to circumvent the Brandenburg incitement 
test by bringing intentional tort claims.
137
 However, courts continued to 
immunize speech that was found to have a ―tendency to lead to violence,‖ 
unless the speech fell within an unprotected category, regardless of 
intent.
138
 For example, after viewing the violent film Natural Born Killers, 
a Louisiana appellate court held that it did not constitute ―incitement‖—
despite providing the idea for the copycat crime that rendered the plaintiff 
a paraplegic—so ―the intent of the [movie producer and director was] not 
material.‖139  
Other plaintiffs have argued that the nature of the negligent speech—
such as commercial or pornographic speech—should relax constitutional 
review of negligent speech liability, and a few courts agreed and created 
balancing tests to constitutionalize negligence liability for less-than-fully-
protected speech. For example, one federal court found liability against a 
magazine publisher that negligently advertised ―gun-for-hire‖ services by 
constitutionalizing the prima facie case of negligence relative to the 
advertisements (which the court characterized as commercial speech) and 
held that they created an obvious ―clear and present‖ danger of death, as 
opposed to ordinary forseeability of death.
140
 Similarly, a Georgia court 
 
 
 137. See, e.g., Byers v. Edmondson, 826 So. 2d 551, 556 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 138. Id. (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1973)). 
 139. Id. (emphasis added). The images in the film Natural Born Killers ―place this film in the 
realm of fantasy‖ that inspired ―copycat‖ behavior, but do not constitute ―incitement.‖ Id. 
 140. See, e.g., Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 
1987). In Norwood, the commercial nature of ―gun for hire‖ advertisements subjected them to 
constitutionally permissible regulation that would not be the case for ―ideological communication[s]‖ 
such as political speech. Id. at 1399–1400 (citations omitted). The court distinguished New York Times 
v. Sullivan, based on the political nature of the editorial ―advertisement‖ in that case, and characterized 
the murder contract advertisement at issue in Norwood as ―at best, ‗commercial speech‘‖ and ―a far cry 
from the type of responsible public debate which the United States Supreme Court obviously intends 
to foster by cases such as New York Times.‖ Id. at 1398, 1401. Compare Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune 
Magazine, 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989) (reversing a jury verdict for $9.4 million against the magazine, 
finding no breach of duty as a matter of law for a gun-for-hire advertisement under risk-utility and 
foreseeability analyses), with Norwood, 651 F. Supp. 1397, and Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 
Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071 (1993) (holding that under Georgia 
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adopted a variable standard for children‘s television programming by 
rejecting the incitement test in favor of the more lenient ―clear and present 
danger‖ test for programming aimed at children.141 However, a variable 
standard for criminal regulation of violent media in accordance with 
Ginsberg v. New York‘s ―variable obscenity‖ doctrine142 was expressly 
rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court in June 2011 in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n,143 where the Court held that violent 
media, unlike sexually explicit media, is fully protected speech.
144
  
Some courts have recognized new categories of unprotected speech or 
transferred other categories of unprotected speech from the criminal 
context to the negligent speech context, to allow tort liability against the 
 
 
law, the magazine‘s ―gun-for hire‖ advertisement, on its face, created a reasonably foreseeable risk of 
death by gun injury). The Eleventh Circuit rejected the magazine‘s First Amendment immunity 
defense, finding that New York Times v. Sullivan required a balancing test, not a categorical approach, 
and the advertisement was far from ―core, non-commercial speech.‖ Id. at 1118 (citations omitted). 
The district court had instructed the jury that they must find that the advertisement created a ―clear and 
present danger‖ to find the defendant liable, a modified negligence instruction that raised the burden of 
proof to meet constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 1116 n.4, 1119. The Eleventh Circuit found that since the 
advertisement itself warned of a ―substantial danger‖ of harm to the public, the instructions given by 
the district court properly reflect the ―modified‖ negligence standard announced in Gertz v. Welch. Id. 
at 1118–19. Requiring obvious proof of a lethal public threat rendered the publisher the cheapest cost-
avoider and satisfied First Amendment demands. Id. at 1114. The court stated that ―[s]imply put, 
liability depends upon whether the burden on the defendant of adopting adequate precautions is less 
than the probability of harm from the defendant‘s unmodified conduct multiplied by the gravity of the 
injury that might result from the defendant‘s unmodified conduct.‖ Id. at 1115 (citing United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)).  
 141. See Walt Disney Prod. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981). The ―Mickey Mouse Club‖ 
program was allegedly negligent by illustrating on television how to make the sound effect of a tire 
coming off of a car by placing BB pellets inside of a balloon and inviting the viewing audience 
(children) to follow along from home. Id. at 581. Plaintiff, a child, was partially blinded when he 
followed along from home, his balloon popped, and a BB pellet struck him in the eye. Id. The court 
held that despite a foreseeable risk of injury, the First Amendment ―mandated‖ summary judgment for 
defendant, since the speech at issue failed to meet the ―clear and present danger‖ test. Id. at 583 (citing 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). 
 142. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 n.4 (1968). 
 143. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). Some plaintiffs‘ lawyers and scholars have argued that ―socially 
repugnant‖ violent speech constitutes ―obscenity‖ and is therefore unprotected, but lower courts have 
rejected a ―violence-based notion of obscenity‖ in accordance with the ―variable obscenity‖ doctrine 
announced in Ginsberg v. New York. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass‘n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 
F.3d 950, 961 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (California ―is asking us to boldly 
go where no court has gone before. We decline the State‘s entreaty to extend the reach of Ginsberg 
and thereby redefine the concept of obscenity under the First Amendment,‖ listing circuit courts that 
also rejected a violence-based notion of obscenity.); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 
(6th Cir. 2002) (declining to extend its obscenity jurisprudence to violent, as opposed to sexually 
explicit, material); Byers, 826 So. 2d at 557, writ denied, 826 So. 2d 1131 (La. 2002) (rejecting a 
―violence-based notion of obscenity.‖); see also KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 146–63 (2003) (discussing cases and scholarly commentary about the 
propriety of extending the variable obscenity doctrine to violent media).  
 144. Id. at 2739. 
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most culpable producers of dangerous speech where ―incitement‖ could 
not be established. For example, two federal courts have recognized 
subliminal suicide commands in rock music as a new category of 
unprotected speech,
145
 and the Fourth Circuit circumvented Brandenburg‘s 
imminence requirement in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises by classifying a 
professional assassin instruction manual admittedly intended to aid and 
abet murder as a ―speech act.‖146 However, other than a few ad hoc 
exceptions, a constitutional right to externalize all social costs of 
foreseeably dangerous speech is the prevailing rule, and no court has 
allowed a finding of incitement in an unreasonably dangerous speech case.  
The normative effect of immunizing dangerous speech from tort 
liability has been to encourage harmful speech production and 
irresponsible marketing, manifested in part by producers targeting children 
in advertisements for the very products that they found inappropriate and 
potentially harmful to children.
147
 Lower courts have responded to the 
current jurisprudential imbalance by carving out exceptions in extreme 
cases of irresponsible and dangerous publications, resulting in a piecemeal 
jurisprudential matrix that is analytically incoherent. An analytical 
approach that is more consistent with scientific knowledge of causation 
and the nature of the fault is both conceivable and desirable. A properly 
 
 
 145. In 1990 and 1991, a state court in Nevada and a federal court in Georgia analyzed whether 
subliminal messages were entitled to First Amendment protection. Both courts found that subliminal 
messages were unprotected speech. See Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991), 
aff‟d, 958 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1992), reh‟g denied, 964 F.2d 1148 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 
U.S. 916 (1992); Vance v. Judas Priest, Nos. 86-5844, 86-3939, 1990 WL 130920, at *25 (Nev. Dist. 
Ct. Aug. 24, 1990). The Osbourne court went into some detail to explain why subliminal speech is 
unprotected by the First Amendment based on the way in which it ―sneaks into the brain,‖ without the 
listener‘s knowledge. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. at 1149. The Judas Priest court found that subliminal 
speech is unprotected because individuals are subjected to the messages ―without [their] knowledge 
and consent,‖ and thus subliminal speech is akin to deceptive advertising, which also influences 
consumers unfairly. Judas Priest, 1990 WL 130920, at *7, *32. The Osbourne court explained the 
scientific differences between subliminal messages and ―preconscious suggestion,‖ the latter of which 
allows the listener to consider the content of the speech. See Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. at 1146–47. A 
California court recently found ―cyberbullying‖ to be unprotected speech, consistent with ―true 
threats‖ jurisprudence. See Tonya Roth, Cyberbullying Held Not Protected Speech in CA Civil Suit, 
FINDLAW (Mar. 23, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/injured/2010/03/ca-court-cyber 
bullying-is-not-protected-speech.html; see also Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. 
v. American Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that ―true threats‖ of 
bodily harm are not protected speech). 
 146. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 246–47 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 
U.S. 1074 (1998). The court relied on a line of cases finding that written instructions on how to 
commit crimes such as tax evasion and illegal drug manufacturing were unprotected speech despite a 
lack of imminence between the speech and the crimes. Id. at 248. 
 147. See supra Part II.  
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tailored negligence paradigm would strike a liability balance that avoids 
chilling speech while also encouraging social responsibility. 
IV. EVIDENTIARY FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONALIZING TORTS 
To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others 
would be harsh and arbitrary in itself.
148
 
The Supreme Court‘s divided opinions in speech-tort cases underscore 
the difficulty in balancing the conflict of interests presented by tort 
liability for speech.
149
 This Part briefly reviews the Court‘s opinions 
concerning tort liability for speech generally for the purpose of identifying 
the policy considerations that have animated the Court‘s speech-tort 
jurisprudence and the methods by which the Court has reconciled tort and 
constitutional policies. The Court has stressed its ―narrow‖ holdings in 
some of these opinions, indicating that reconciling free speech and tort 
liability is a very fact-intensive and case-specific endeavor.
150
 
Nonetheless, the Court‘s evidentiary tailoring method of 
constitutionalizing speech-torts in various cases is instructive on how 
courts could constitutionalize the tort of negligence relative to 
unreasonably dangerous speech. 
A. New York Times v. Sullivan 
In New York Times v. Sullivan,
151
 the Supreme Court first recognized 
that the First Amendment limits a state‘s police power to award tort 
damages for defamation—a category of speech previously assumed to be 
unprotected by the First Amendment. The lawsuit arose from statements 
made by the newspaper that inferentially criticized a public safety 
commissioner‘s official conduct and contained some false statements of 
 
 
 148. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).  
 149. Per Justice Brennan, speech-tort jurisprudence has ―produced a diversity of considered 
opinions, none of which speak for the Court.‖ Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 
U.S. 749, 775 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 
767, 780 (1986) (four justices dissented); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. et al. v. Nation Enter. et al., 
471 U.S. 539, 579 (1985) (three justices dissented); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 
562 (1977) (four justices dissented in two dissenting opinions); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) 
(four justices filed dissenting opinions); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 402, 411 (1967) (three 
justices dissented and one justice dissented in part). 
 150. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 
535–36 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 151. 376 U.S. 254, 283–84 (1964). 
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fact.
152
 The Court specifically rejected a categorical approach to the issue 
of whether defamatory false statements of fact constitute unprotected 
speech, finding that speech cannot claim ―talismanic immunity from 
constitutional limitations‖ merely because it is labeled as ―libel.‖153 The 
Court also rejected Sullivan‘s attempt to categorize the paid advertisement 
as ―commercial speech,‖154 finding that the speech was political in 
nature.
155
 The Court explained that political speech must be fiercely 
protected and given ―breathing space‖ to avoid chilling robust debate 
concerning self-government.
156
 Since erroneous statements are ―inevitable 
in free debate,‖ the Constitution requires protection of insignificant false 
statements of fact to protect core political speech, mandating constitutional 
limits to states‘ police power to punish even untrue statements contained 
in political speech.
157
  
The Court concluded that the First Amendment requires evidentiary 
modifications to a prima facie case of defamation arising from speech 
critical of the government and created a narrowly tailored prima facie case 
of political speech defamation to meet constitutional scrutiny. The Court 
raised the level of fault necessary to establish the claim from negligence or 
strict liability
158
 to ―actual malice,‖ meaning the defendant actually knew 
that the speech was false or published it with reckless disregard 
concerning its veracity.
159
 The actual malice standard shifted the burden of 
proof that the speech was false onto the plaintiff, instead of the common 
 
 
 152. For example, the newspaper advertisement stated that Martin Luther King, Jr. had been 
arrested seven times, when he had really been arrested four times; the Alabama State College Campus 
dining hall had been padlocked to starve the students into submission when in fact the hall was never 
padlocked; and that the police were guilty of ―ringing‖ the campus with ―loads of police armed with 
shotguns and tear-gas‖ in connection with a peaceful demonstration, when the police were not called 
to the campus in connection with the demonstration at all. See id. at 257–59 & 305 (App.).  
 153. Id. at 269.  
 154. Id. at 265–66. 
 155. The Court stated: ―[T]he rule is that we ‗examine for ourselves the statements in issue and 
the circumstances under which they were made to see . . . whether they are of a character which the 
principles of the First Amendment . . . protect[s].‘‖ Id. at 285 (quoting Pennekamp v. Fla., 328 U.S. 
331, 335 (1946)). The Court focused on the political nature of the speech, which it deemed a core tenet 
of First Amendment protection. Id. at 296–97. 
 156. Id. at 272.  
 157. Id. at 280–81. The Court recognized that the fear of civil liability ―may be markedly more 
inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.‖ Id. at 277. In this case, the jury 
awarded 1,000 times the maximum criminal penalty in the civil trial, i.e., $500,000. Id. at 277–78. 
 158. The common law of England allowed strict liability for libel. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Daily 
Mirror Newspapers, Ltd. (1929) 2 A.C. 331 (K.B.) at 55 (Eng.) (wife established liability against 
newspaper based on its accurate report of her husband‘s statements that implied that he was not 
married to wife, with whom he cohabited).  
 159. 376 U.S. at 281–83. 
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law rule that truth was a defense.
160
 The Court also raised the level of 
proof required to establish fault from the general tort burden of a 
―preponderance of evidence‖ to a heightened burden of ―clear and 
convincing evidence.‖161 Ultimately, the Court held that even untrue and 
defamatory speech that was historically unprotected must be shielded from 
tort liability to safeguard core political speech in the absence of clear 
evidence of the speaker‘s substantial fault. Nonetheless, the Court 
recognized that political speech is not immune from defamation 
liability.
162
  
B. Supreme Court Speech-Tort Precedent: The Evidentiary Tailoring 
Method 
Supreme Court cases subsequent to New York Times v. Sullivan used an 
interest-balancing approach to resolve the conflict between the First 
Amendment interest in protecting speech and states‘ and individuals‘ 
interest in tort liability. In these cases, the Court often modified the 
elements of tort claims to render them sufficiently protective of speech to 
meet First Amendment scrutiny.
163
 The Court‘s decisions created three 
levels of evidentiary tailoring in defamation cases,
164
 applied the actual 
malice standard to public figures‘ emotional distress claims, and identified 
three dominant policy considerations to determine how to reconcile free 
speech with tort liability.  
First, private citizens generally receive more state law protection from 
dignitary or emotional harm than public figures because private 
individuals are more vulnerable to injury and have not assumed the risks 
that attend fame. Second, whether the speech is ―of public concern‖ or of a 
―truly private nature‖ is the most critical factor in determining its level of 
constitutional protection. Third, the state has a greater interest in using tort 
 
 
 160. Id. at 271, 278–79.  
 161. Id. at 285–86 (the constitutional standard demands ―convincing clarity‖); see also Gertz v. 
Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (clarifying that the standard is ―clear and convincing proof‖).  
 162. Since the evidence proved mere negligence, it was ―constitutionally insufficient‖ level of 
fault to impose liability for political speech. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 288. Justices Black and Douglas 
would have recognized an ―absolute, unconditional constitutional right‖ to criticize public officials.  Id. 
at 293 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring); see also id. at 294 (Goldberg & Douglas, JJ., concurring) 
(finding an ―absolute, unconditional privilege‖). 
 163. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757 (1985) (―We 
must . . . balance the State‘s interest . . . against the First Amendment.‖).  
 164. Id. at 779 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
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liability to protect some values over others, with emotional or dignitary 
harm representing the nadir of the state‘s interest in punishing speech.165  
1. Narrow Tailoring of Tort Claim Elements for Speech That Causes 
Dignitary or Emotional Harm to Public Figures & Broad 
Protection For Accurate Republication of Public Records and 
Public Forum Political Speech That Cannot Be Characterized as 
“False” 
Shortly after New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court clarified that the 
level of constitutional tailoring necessary to constitutionalize a claim for 
defamation turns in part on the plaintiff‘s status as a public figure or a 
private individual and extended the actual malice standard to all ―public 
figures.‖166 Public figures presumably have less need for, and are less 
deserving of, state protection from defamatory speech, warranting their 
higher actual malice burden of proof to establish a claim. Public figures 
take affirmative action to inject themselves into the public spotlight with 
 
 
 165. See, e.g., Deana Pollard Sacks, Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court‟s Speech-Tort 
Jurisprudence, and Normative Considerations, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 193, 210–13 (2010), available 
at http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/supreme-court/snyder-v.-phelps,-the-supreme-
court%27s-speech%11tort-jurisprudence,-and-normative-considerations/ (illustrating these three factors 
relative to a private individual‘s claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress arising from picketing and an online ―epic‖ concerning his son). The Court in Snyder v. Phelps 
indicated that the nature of the speech was the dominant factor, but carefully limited its holding and 
declined to review the defendants‘ online ―epic‖ derogating the plaintiff‘s family, which presumably 
would be less protected than the picketing. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 n.1 (2011); see 
also Deana Pollard Sacks, Snyder v. Phelps: A Prediction Based on Oral Arguments and the Supreme 
Court‟s Established Speech-Tort Jurisprudence, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. 418, 428–29 (analyzing the 
Court‘s statements and questions during oral argument that indicated they would engage in ―line-
drawing‖ as in other speech-tort cases, and that they distinguished the picketing from the online 
―epic,‖ the latter of which seemed to warrant less constitutional protection).  
 166. See Assoc. Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 140 (1967) (former Army general accused of 
leading an angry crowd to obstruct federal marshalls who were facilitating desegregation at the 
University of Mississippi); Curtis Publ‘g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1967) (former head 
coach of the University of Georgia football team accused of game-fixing). In Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., the Court defined two types of public figures. 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (noting that ―[t]hose who, 
by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the 
public's attention, are properly classed as public figures and those who hold governmental office may 
recover for injury to [their] reputation‖). ―All purpose‖ public figures are persons who have achieved 
―pervasive fame or notoriety,‖ whereas limited public figures inject themselves into a particular public 
controversy and thereby become a public figure for a limited range of issues. Id. at 351. The Court 
later clarified that being extremely wealthy and going through a high profile divorce does not render 
the divorcing parties public figures, despite the wife holding press conferences regarding the divorce. 
Id. at 377–78 n.10 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972)). 
Similarly the fact that divorce proceedings are judicial in nature does not render divorcing parties 
―public figures‖ despite broad public interest in the judicial proceedings. Id. at 378–79 (White, J., 
dissenting); see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976).  
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―exceedingly rare‖ exception, and thereby assume the risk167 of public 
criticism and even ―sharp attacks‖ on their character and integrity.168 In 
addition, the fame that accompanies public figure status provides access to 
the media for purposes of counter-speech, and public figures can therefore 
engage in ―self-help‖ to protect their reputation.169  
The actual malice standard, including the plaintiff‘s burden of 
establishing factual falsity, was extended to a public figure‘s intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim in Hustler v. Falwell,
170
 and almost 
certainly applies to public figures‘ false light invasion of privacy171 claims 
as well.
172
 In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court rejected altogether a privacy 
claim against a radio station that broadcast an intended private cell phone 
conversation that had been intercepted illegally by an unknown third party, 
 
 
 167. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–45 (a public official ―runs the risk of closer public scrutiny‖ than a 
private defamation plaintiff); see also Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 756 (explaining that ―private 
persons have not voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory 
statements‖). Assumption of the risk is a defense to negligence and strict liability that provides that if 
the plaintiff voluntarily agreed to accept the consequences of a known risk, then the defendant is 
relieved from liability for injury resulting from that risk. See DOBBS, supra note 63, at 534, 962, 1175.  
 168. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  
 169. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (stating that ―self-help‖ means accessing the media to ―contradict the 
lie‖).  
 170. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Falwell‘s claims of libel and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress were both subjected to the actual malice standard, the Court 
emphasized Falwell‘s public status and the value of derogatory parody and satire in political 
commentary. Id. at 52–53. To hold otherwise would allow a public figure to circumvent the actual 
malice standard by re-casting the grievance as a claim for emotional distress, which would create an 
―end around First Amendment strictures.‖ See Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial 
Workers Int‘l Union, 585 F. Supp. 2d 815, 818–20 (E.D. Va. 2008) (explaining Supreme Court 
decisions applying the actual malice standard to non-dignitary torts); see also Food Lion, Inc. v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 522–23 (4th Cir. 1999) (actual malice standard applied to 
grocer‘s claim for reputation damages).  
 171. The tort of invasion of privacy includes four separate causes of action: intrusive invasions, 
public disclosure of private facts, false light, and commercial appropriation. See DOBBS, supra note 63, 
at 1198. The elements of false light invasion of privacy are so similar to defamation that some states, 
such as Texas, reject the claim as redundant and unnecessary. More generally, since the injuries caused 
by the first three are reputation injury, humiliation, and embarrassment, they would likely be treated 
with less deference relative to the First Amendment than commercial appropriation, which protects the 
financial interests of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 
(1977) (the state has a greater interest in protected proprietary interests than emotions or reputation); 
infra Part IV.B.3. 
 172. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, LIFE Magazine substantially misreported the facts concerning a private 
family‘s kidnapping ordeal. 385 U.S. 374, 377–78 (1967). The Court extended the ―actual malice‖ 
standard to the private family members, who brought a false light invasion of privacy claim against the 
magazine. Id. at 378–79. However, most scholars believe that this aspect of Time was overruled in 
Gertz v. Welch, where the Court clarified that the status of the plaintiff as a public figure or private 
individual has a large effect on the level of tailoring in a defamation claim, and today a case like Time 
would be governed by the evidentiary standard set forth in Gertz v. Welch. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1056 (3d. ed. 2006) (noting that after Gertz v. 
Welch, the ―actual malice‖ standard ―no longer would apply‖ under the facts of Time, Inc.). 
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stating that ―privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest 
in publishing matters of public importance.‖173 The parties to the cell 
phone conversation were characterized as ―limited public figures‖ because 
they were public school union negotiators and the speech was a matter of 
public concern, warranting a very high level of constitutional protection.
174
 
It was undisputed that the taped conversation was accurate, so the Court 
had no reason to discuss the actual malice standard. Still, the Court‘s 
decision essentially converges with its reasoning in Hustler v. Falwell in 
terms of denying liability for emotional or dignitary claims as to public 
figures or limited public figures where speech of public concern cannot be 
characterized as ―false.‖  
The Supreme Court recently dealt with a very controversial speech-tort 
case in Snyder v. Phelps, where, again, the injurious speech was incapable 
of being characterized as ―false,‖ rendering chilling concerns palpable, and 
motivating the Court to deny tort liability.
175
 In Snyder v. Phelps, the Court 
found that political speech communicated by means of picketing on a 
public sidewalk could not form the basis for emotional or dignitary tort 
liability where the speech could not be proven untrue and there was no 
personal animus directed at the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff was not 
a public figure.
176
 In this case, church members whose mantra was ―God 
Hates Fags‖ and who purported to believe that God punishes the United 
States for its tolerance of homosexuality picketed the funeral of a fallen 
marine with highly offensive signs aimed at the marine, causing his father 
to suffer severe emotional distress.
177
 A jury awarded the father nearly 
eleven million dollars for emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and 
punitive damages, but the Court determined that the verdict could not 
stand on the picketing alone.
178
 The Court demonstrated more concern 
 
 
 173. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001). 
 174. Id. at 539–40 (distinguishing full-purpose public figures from ―limited‖ purpose public 
figures) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351). The Court stated: ―In these cases, privacy concerns give way 
when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance. . . . One of the costs 
associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy.‖ Id. at 534.  
 175. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 176. Id. at 1216–17. The Court highlighted the ―public forum‖ location of the picketing, and 
stressed the narrowness of its holding. Id. at 1218–20.  
 177. For details on the facts of Snyder v. Phelps, see Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court‟s 
Speech-Tort Jurisprudence, and Normative Considerations, supra note 165.  
 178. The Snyder v. Phelps Court declined to consider the more difficult issue of whether Mr. 
Snyder could recover in tort for the online ―epic‖ the ―church‖ created and published that was grossly 
invasive and focused on his deceased son, and which quite foreseeably would cause Mr. Snyder 
extreme emotional distress and even physical injury (exacerbated prior condition in his case). 131 S. 
Ct. at 1214 n.1. For more details on the procedural history and facts of Snyder v. Phelps, see Snyder v. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/1
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about punishing speech that was political in nature and disseminated via 
traditional grass-roots ―self-government‖ than the plaintiff‘s status as a 
public figure or private individual because, as a whole, the ―dominant 
theme‖ of the picketing was political speech.179 In addition, a jury‘s 
discretion concerning the ―outrageous‖ element of a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress could become an ―instrument for the 
suppression of . . . ‗vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasant‘ 
expression‖—the very expression most at risk for chilling.180 Without the 
built-in verifiable element of factual falsity, the risk of chilling political 
speech was too high, and that risk overcame any real consideration 
concerning the plaintiff‘s level of vulnerability. 
The Court has also recognized a very high level of constitutional 
protection for accurate republication of private facts about private 
individuals contained in government-generated public records. Applying 
strict scrutiny to state privacy statutes that conferred liability for such 
republication,
181
 the Court determined that accurate republication of 
information contained in public criminal records is fully protected from 
tort liability regardless of how personal or embarrassing the facts may be, 
including publishing rape victims‘ identifying information.182 Any other 
outcome would essentially impose strict liability against newspapers for 
accurately republishing the contents of criminal public records.
183
  
The privacy statute cases and Snyder v. Phelps clarify that the public 
nature of the speech is the most critical factor in determining its level of 
 
 
Phelps, the Supreme Court‟s Speech-Tort Jurisprudence, and Normative Considerations, supra note 
165. 
 179. 131 S. Ct. at 1215–17. 
 180. Id. at 1219 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984)).  
 181. The tort liability created by the state privacy statutes was framed as a legislative deprivation 
of fundamental First Amendment rights, and therefore received strict scrutiny review. The statutes 
essentially created strict liability for accurately publishing the contents of public records. 
 182. See, e.g., The Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536 (1989) (Florida statute that prohibited 
publishing the names of rape victims, inter alia, was held to violate the First Amendment because the 
state had less restrictive means to keep rape victims‘ names confidential and failed to employ them); 
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491–92 (1975) (rape and murder victim‘s name was 
broadcasted in violation of a Georgia privacy statute, but since information was derived from public 
court records, the First Amendment shielded network from tort liability); see also Bowley v. City of 
Uniontown Police Dept., 404 F.3d 783, 786 (3d Cir. 2005) (First Amendment shielded newspaper 
from civil liability for publishing truthful information about a juvenile obtained from police report 
which violated a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the disclosure of juvenile records).  
 183. See also, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ‘g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1979) (holding that 
West Virginia statute criminalizing publication of the name of any youth charged as a juvenile 
offender violated the First Amendment); Okla. Publ‘g Co. v. Dist. Ct., 430 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1977) 
(per curiam) (holding that pretrial order restraining publication of the name or photograph of an 11-
year-old boy in relation to a pending juvenile proceeding involving murder violated the First 
Amendment).  
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constitutional protection. This factor trumps plaintiffs‘ private status, at 
least where the injury claimed is emotional or dignitary in nature, the 
speech relates to self-government, and the speech either cannot be 
characterized as factually false or was previously recorded in government-
generated public databases.
184
 
2. Intermediate Tailoring For Private Individuals‟ Defamation Claims 
Arising From Public Concern Speech & The Import of Snyder v. 
Phelps Relative to Private Individuals 
The free speech-tort liability balance is recalibrated where defamatory 
speech of ―public concern‖ harms private individuals, because they are 
―more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is 
correspondingly greater.‖185 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court 
considered liability for libel arising from a factually untrue and grossly 
derogatory newspaper story that defamed Elmer Gertz, a respected 
attorney with strong community ties who brought a wrongful death action 
on behalf of the family of a young man who was shot and killed by a 
police officer.
186
 The Court rejected the defendant‘s attempt to 
characterize Gertz as a ―public figure,‖ despite the fact that he had 
authored books and was active in community affairs, because he had not 
acquired the requistite level of fame.
187
 The Court later characterized the 
news story about Gertz‘s involvement in a high profile wrongful death 
case against a police officer as ―at the heart of the First Amendment‘s 
 
 
 184. Justice Breyer would engage a more balanced approach to speech regulation than the other 
Members of the Court. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1221–22 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(noting that on balance, the speech cannot be punished because to do so would not ―proportionately 
advanc[e] the State‘s interest in protecting its citizens against severe emotional harm.‖); see also 
Brown v. Entm‘t Merchs. Ass‘n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2766 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer 
stated: 
I would evaluate the degree to which the statute injures speech-related interests, the nature of 
the potentially-justifying ‗compelling interests,‘ the degree to which the statute furthers that 
interest, the nature and effectiveness of possible alternatives, and, in light of this evaluation, 
whether, overall, ‗the statute works speech-related harm . . . out of proportion to the benefits 
that the statute seeks to provide.‘ 
Id. 
 185. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).  
 186. Id. at 325.  
 187. Id. at 351–52. Elmer Gertz had not ―thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue.‖ Id. at 
352. Among other things, the John Birch Society‘s newspaper, American Opinion, asserted as a fact 
that Gertz ―framed‖ the guilty police officer (Nuccio) as part of a Communist campaign to discredit 
local police departments for the purpose of establishing a federal (Communist) police force capable of 
supporting a Communist dictatorship. Id. at 325–26. The article referred to Gertz as a ―Leninist,‖ a 
―Communist-fronter,‖ and falsely implied that Gertz had a criminal record so large that it took ―a big, 
Irish cop to lift.‖ Id. at 326. None of these allegations were established as true. Id. at 326–27. 
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protection,‖188 but clarified that the ―need to avoid self-censorship by the 
news media is . . . not the only societal value at issue,‖189 and a ―proper 
accommodation‖ of the competing state interest to protect a private 
individual‘s reputation warrants a less stringent constitutional test than 
actual malice.
190
  
Accordingly, where a private individual is defamed by speech of public 
concern, the Court revised the prima facie case of public figure defamation 
created in New York Times v. Sullivan by: (1) reducing proof of fault from 
actual malice to negligence;
191
 (2) allowing recovery of actual damages 
upon proof of fault by a preponderance of evidence;
192
 and (3) shifting the 
burden of proving truth back to the defendant,
193
 although the Court later 
shifted this burden back to the plaintiff, at least where the defendant was 
the media.
194
 In an apparent attempt to avoid chilling speech, the Court 
added an element of ―actual damages‖ to a ―private individual-public 
concern‖ plaintiff‘s prima facie case of defamation, an element that had 
never been required to establish defamation, but which has always been an 
element of negligence.
195
  
Some courts assumed that the same constitutional standard applies to 
private individuals‘ claims for other dignitary or emotional harm arising 
from public concern speech,
196
 but Snyder v. Phelps undermined this 
assumption, at least relative to speech that cannot be characterized as 
 
 
 188. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (quoting First 
Nat‘l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). 
 189. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341. 
 190. Id. at 342.  
 191. Id. at 347–48, 350. The Court left the contours of the lesser fault standard up to the states. Id. 
at 347. Most states, however, have adopted negligence as the fault standard post-Gertz.  
 192. See id. at 349–50. The actual malice standard of proof was retained relative to presumed and 
punitive damages. Id. at 349.  
 193. Id. at 347 n.10. This results from rejecting the actual malice standard. Id. at 342–43. 
 194. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). Although Hepps involved a 
media defendant, it is reasonable to conclude that the burden of proving falsity shifts to the plaintiff in 
all private person/public concern cases. Id. at 776; see also, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 783–
84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the rights of the media are no greater than the rights of 
anyone else speaking out on public issues, so the same speech-tort rules should apply to all 
defendants); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 24 n.2 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(noting that a ―fundamental First Amendment principle that ‗[t]he inherent worth of . . . speech in 
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of the source, 
expressing concern over the Court‘s apparent distinction between media and non-media defendants 
(quoting Hepps, 475 U.S. at 780 (Brennan, J., concurring))).  
 195. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349 (―[S]tate remedies for defamatory falsehood [should] reach no farther 
than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved.‖). 
 196. See, e.g., Herring v. Adkins, 150 Ohio Misc. 2d 13, 19 n.3 (C.P. Clermont Cnty. 2008) 
(―[F]ederal law states that when determining whether speech is protected, courts must apply the same 
standard to all torts as that applied in defamation cases.‖). 
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untrue in circumstances that fall within its ―narrow‖ political-picketing-
speech holding.
197
 The Snyder v. Phelps Court focused almost exclusively 
on the nature of the speech
198
 and how it was disseminated.
199
 All of the 
circumstances of that case concerning the content and context of the 
speech overshadowed any concern about the plaintiff‘s level of 
vulnerability in reaching the liability conclusion. Notably, the Court 
declined to address the online ―epic‖ that targeted plaintiff‘s family 
specifically for abuse and which surely deserved a lesser level of 
constitutional protection.
200
 It is fair to assume that Justices Breyer and 
Alito were correct and that the plaintiff‘s private status remained relevant 
to the speech-tort balance in situations distinguishable from the ―grass 
roots‖ political speech considered in Snyder v. Phelps, such as the online 
―epic‖ not considered by the Court.201 
Accordingly, the vulnerability of persons harmed by speech should 
affect its level of constitutional protection in many circumstances. Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc. and other Supreme Court precedent indicate that the 
potential for speech to harm vulnerable persons affects the state‘s interest 
in punishing the speech and the attendant level of evidentiary tailoring to 
constitutionalize a tort claim.
202
  
 
 
 197. See 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). The Court stressed the fact-based narrowness of its holding, and 
the opinion should be viewed as limited to its extraordinary facts. Id. at 1220. The facts of Snyder v. 
Phelps are indeed unique. The Court specifically found that the defendants‘ motive was to garner 
attention for their political/religious messages, that they did not violate local laws in conducting their 
picketing activities on a public sidewalk, and that they did not target the plaintiff for attack per se, but 
rather, capitalized on his son‘s untimely death to disseminate their message at his funeral, as they had 
been doing for many years through similar funeral picketing activities. Id. at 1214, 1218. 
 198. The Court stated that ―[w]hether the First Amendment prohibits [tort liability for speech] 
turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the 
circumstances of the case.‖ Id. at 1215. The Court explained that, in deciding the nature of the speech, 
―content, form, and context‖ must be considered and, while no factor is dispositive, the overall nature 
of the speech drives the constitutional analysis. Id. at 1216. 
 199. The place of the political speech was central to the opinion, and it was ―entitled to special 
protection‖ because it was disseminated in a public place through traditional means on matters of 
public concern. Id. at 1218. 
 200. Id. at 1214. 
 201. See id. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring) (the opinion is restricted to the picketing activity and 
does not analyze television broadcasting or internet postings); see also id. at 1226–27 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the epic addressed the private Snyder family directly, and this attack was not 
speech on a public concern). The Justices made numerous statements during oral arguments that 
indicated their view that some ―line-drawing‖ would be in order relative to liability for the epic or 
similar speech in other factual contexts. See Snyder v. Phelps: A Prediction Based on Oral Arguments 
and the Supreme Court‟s Established Speech-Tort Jurisprudence, supra note 165, at 428 n.74. 
 202. See 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1973); see also, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. 
Ct. 1800, 1812–13 (2009) (relying on the number of children in a television audience to determine 
whether indecent speech should be protected; upholding change in FCC policy that removed ―safe 
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3. Minimal Tailoring and Deference to State Law Where the Speech is 
Purely Private or Causes Proprietary Harm 
The Court adopted a much more relaxed evidentiary burden of proof in 
defamation cases where both the plaintiff and the subject matter of the 
speech were private. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc.,
203
 a credit reporting agency that negligently misreported Greenmoss‘s 
assets and liabilities to several of Greenmoss‘s potential business 
associates
204
 raised the First Amendment as a defense to Greenmoss‘s 
negligence claim, and argued that proof of actual malice was required to 
impose tort liability in the absence of proof of actual damages, i.e., the 
Gertz standard.
205
 The Court rejected that argument and reasoned that the 
First Amendment concern at issue was ―less important‖ than the public 
interest crime story at issue in Gertz v. Welch, because the 
communications concerning credit worthiness were purely private in 
nature, and therefore of ―reduced constitutional value.‖206 The Court 
highlighted the commercial nature of the speech, which was ―solely 
motivated by the desire for profit,‖ as well as its ―objective 
verifiability,‖207 and characterized the speech as ―hardy and unlikely to be 
deterred‖ by tort liability.208 Therefore, awards of presumed and even 
punitive damages for defamation are constitutional upon proof of ordinary 
negligence by a preponderance of evidence in purely private matters, at 
least when the speech has indicia of ―hardiness.‖209 The Court clarified 
that the Constitution requires proof of some fault to support defamation 
 
 
harbor‖ for single-word expletives); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (adopting a variable 
level of protection for sexually explicit speech depending on the age of the consumer). 
 203. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).  
 204. Id. at 751. A seventeen-year-old employee had mistakenly attributed a bankruptcy claim of a 
former Greenmoss employee to the company itself. Id. at 752.  
 205. Id. at 752. 
 206. Id. at 758, 761. 
 207. Id. at 762; see also id. at 788 n.13 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (explaining that the states have 
more latitude to regulate commercial speech because of its ―greater objectivity and hardiness‖) 
(emphasis added). Where speech is objectively verifiable, the risk of chilling is presumably reduced, 
since liability is predictable and avoidable. See, e.g., Christopher P. Guzelian, Scientific Speech, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 881 (2008) (arguing that objectively verifiable speech is entitled to less First 
Amendment protection). 
 208. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762.  
 209. Id. at 761. The changes made to Gertz v. Welch‘s intermediate level of scrutiny were: (1) the 
burden of proof was reduced to preponderance of evidence; (2) presumed damages were allowed 
without proving actual damages; and (3) punitive damages were allowed upon proof of negligence 
only. Note, however, that state laws often require a showing of a malicious state of mind/ill will 
towards the plaintiff or intentional fraud for recovery of punitive damages, and some require proof of 
by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1997); see also DOBBS, 
supra note 63, at 1064–69.  
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liability, rendering common law strict liability for defamation 
unconstitutional, but otherwise deferred to state law.
210
 
The Court has shown more deference to state tort law where the 
plaintiff suffered actual harm, as opposed to intangible, dignitary, or 
emotional harm. The Court has opined that states have a heightened 
interest in protecting property rights, and has found liability for monetary 
or proprietary losses regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public figure, 
the speech is political in nature, or the speech is amenable to 
characterization as true or false. The Court has not considered the relative 
state interest in tort liability to protect against bodily harm or death.  
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
211
 the plaintiff, a 
stunt performer, claimed that his proprietary human cannonball stunt had 
been misappropriated by a television station that videotaped and 
broadcasted his stunt on the evening news without his consent.
212
 A 
closely divided Court held that when the state seeks to protect the 
plaintiff‘s property interests, as opposed to merely ―feelings or 
reputation,‖ the actual malice standard does not apply.213 Unlike the 
dignitary concern at issue in New York Times v. Sullivan, the state‘s 
interest here was ―analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law,‖214 
and protecting the fruits of one‘s ideas through tort liability furthers the 
First Amendment policy of encouraging creative ingenuity.
215
 Similarly, in 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
216
 the Court held 
that misappropriation of a former president‘s political speech is actionable 
 
 
 210. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347–48 (1974) (states should not impose 
defamation liability without fault). English common law allowed for strict liability for defamation, but 
many of the states already required negligence to sustain a defamation claim, requiring no 
modifications to the common law prima facie case. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, 
Ltd., [1929] 2 A.C. 331 (K.B.) at 54 (Eng.) (libel claim sustained on strict liability principles); see also 
DOBBS, supra note 63, at 1117–21. 
 211. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).  
 212. Id. at 569.  
 213. Id. at 573.  
 214. Id.  
 215. Id. The Court also distinguished Zacchini from Time, Inc. v. Hill based on the regulatory 
consequences of the remedy sought. Id. at 577–78. Unlike liability for public dissemination of private 
facts, which would operate to ―minimize publication‖ of the public interest information, Zacchini‘s 
right of publicity did not seek to enjoin the broadcast, but rather sought compensation for it.  Id. at 573–
74. 
 216. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). Gerald Ford entered into a book-publishing contract with Harper & 
Row to publish his ―memoirs‖ concerning the Watergate crisis, which resulted in another contract with 
Time Magazine to publish excerpts of the book prior to its release. Id. Just prior to Time‘s expected 
publication date, The Nation, a political magazine, obtained a stolen copy of Ford‘s manuscript and 
published it. Id. The Nation‘s publication caused Time to cancel its agreement with Ford, resulting in 
substantial damages to Ford. Id. at 542–43. 
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in tort. The Court found that First Amendment principles were enhanced 
by protecting proprietary manuscripts,
217
 in part because President Gerald 
Ford suffered substantial out-of-pocket losses when The Nation Magazine 
misappropriated and published a stolen copy of his intellectual property.  
The balancing factors produced by the Supreme Court‘s speech-tort 
precedent have helped determine the appropriate level of constitutional 
scrutiny when tort liability is challenged on First Amendment grounds. 
Generally, the Court has raised the prima facie evidentiary burdens to 
―reconcile‖ tort liability with the First Amendment, but at times the Court 
rejected dignitary or emotional claims altogether when they arose from 
political speech that related directly to self-government and either could 
not be characterized as objectively false or was an accurate republication 
of government-generated public records. Nonetheless, the Court‘s speech-
tort precedent, taken as a whole, created analytical factors and policy 
considerations that are valuable in resolving the conflict of rights 
presented by tort liability for speech.  
V. THE CASE FOR REFORMATION 
The lower courts‘ departure from the Supreme Court‘s evidentiary 
tailoring method of constitutionalizing defamation and other speech-tort 
liability in the negligent speech cases likely resulted from the fact that 
negligent speech is different than, and more prone to chilling than, the 
types of speech for which the Supreme Court has approved tort liability. 
The central difference is proof of causation. Causation was a non-issue in 
all of the Supreme Court speech-tort cases in which tort liability was 
 
 
 217. Id. at 558 (―[C]opyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.‖). 
The Court has also ruled that publishing the name of a confidential source of political news in breach 
of a confidentiality agreement was not immune from civil liability. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). In Cohen, the Court allowed a source of political speech directly related to 
an election to maintain an action for actual damages, including lost wages, against a news publisher 
which violated a promise to keep the source‘s name confidential; the breach caused him to lose his job. 
Id. at 671. Cohen was not a speech-tort case, however, raising a state action issue, since a private 
confidentiality agreement—not state tort regulation—created the liability for speech. Id. at 668–69. 
Some scholars have argued that where legal obligations are defined by the parties, as opposed to the 
government, the First Amendment does not apply. See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, 
Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1685–97 (2009) 
(distinguishing ―duty-defining‖ government power such as tort liability from ―non-duty-defining‖ 
power where legal duties are negotiated by private parties); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2000) (arguing that it is ―proper to let speakers contract away their 
rights‖). But see Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 363–64 (1998) (arguing that Cohen is incoherent, and both tort and contract 
actions that punish speech should be subject to constitutional scrutiny).  
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allowed, because the speech in those cases share the common 
characteristic of direct injury based on verifiable facts, that is, whether the 
speech was factually false and defamatory or in fact misappropriated.
218
 
The factually verifiable nature of the speech causing direct injury that the 
Court has found subject to tort liability operates to avoid the chilling effect 
of tort liability, since liability is more predictable and avoidable.  
To the contrary, the violent and dangerous speech cases in which the 
lower courts denied liability involved indirect injury resulting from 
intervening causes, i.e., human reactions to speech, that were allegedly 
instigated by the dangerous speech. In these cases, the speech itself was 
indeterminate and incapable of a factual determination concerning its 
wrongfulness because it did not directly cause harm. Like the speech 
involved in Brandenburg v. Ohio, injury depended upon the effect of the 
speech on the audience‘s conduct. This renders the speech more prone to 
chilling, as speakers cannot predict all reactions to their speech and 
possible resulting harm, and may decline to speak in the first place to 
avoid the risk of punishment. Therefore, to adequately protect 
indeterminate speech that allegedly harms foreseeably but indirectly by 
instigating intervening human reactions, lower courts sought to erect 
appropriate First Amendment barriers to liability for this type of 
―instigating‖ speech. Brandenburg‘s incitement test was the closest 
analogy in the case law at the time the seminal violent media cases arose, 
considering the similar intervening human causes. However, the 
incitement test is entirely inapposite and cannot address the causation 
issues presented by modern negligent speech cases. A negligence-based 
analysis would be better. 
A. The Inapposite Nature of the Incitement Test 
The incitement test is inapposite relative to the social risks presented 
by contemporary violent media, and in particular, the effects of violent 
video games on children. The incitement test requires that the speaker 
 
 
 218. Once the determination was made that speech was factually false or misappropriated, there 
was no issue of causation, as false defamatory speech is presumed to injure reputation, and 
misappropriated speech disturbs the speech producer‘s proprietary interests per se. The exception is 
Hustler v. Falwell, where the parody was verifiably false. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The Court, however, 
applied the actual malice standard because Jerry Falwell was clearly a public figure who spoke out on 
political and religious issues, and to allow him to recover damages based on a lower standard of proof 
would have created a jurisprudential loophole undermining the speech protection recognized in New 
York Times v. Sullivan. Id. at 51. In addition, the jury in Hustler v. Falwell had found that the parody 
was not defamatory because it could not ―reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about 
[Fallwell] or actual events in which [he] participated.‖ Id. at 49.  
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intend to cause lawlessness and contemporaneous or imminent social 
harm, and arose in the context of live political advocacy that potentially 
agitated the audience and incited immediate riots or other serious public 
risk. The test should be discarded relative to violent media for two reasons 
based on its two elements.  
First, producers of violent media are generally profit-driven 
corporations whose directors and artists presumably do not intend to 
advocate lawless audience reactions. To the contrary, violent audience 
reactions to their media almost certainly are not in their best interests 
because such reactions may create bad publicity and hurt public relations 
and profits. Applying Brandenburg‘s intent requirement to producers of 
violent media is senseless because the fault, if any, lies in producers‘ 
disregard of the risks posed by their media, or even conscious abuse of the 
current law to maximize profits, but not intent to cause public harm.
219
 
This type of fault is addressed by the law of negligence.
220
 Liability for 
harms caused by violent media should revolve around a constitutional 
application of negligence liability, not transportation of the inapposite 
incitement test to a context factually and theoretically divorced from its 
origination.  
Second, the incitement test‘s requirement of a likelihood of ―imminent‖ 
harm automatically excludes both types of direct and indirect risks posed 
by violent video games. Copycat crimes or other acts of aggression 
associated with consumption of violent media involve intervening human 
causes that are rarely, if ever, imminent. Indeed, a requirement of 
imminence is directly contrary to the scientific evidence that explains the 
correlation between consumption of violent media and subsequent acts of 
aggression. As explained in Part I, the cognitive desensitization process 
and creation of cognitive scripts that can result from violent media and 
lead to acts of aggression is slow and cumulative, not immediate or 
imminent. The incitement test is fundamentally at odds with the slow and 
 
 
 219. See supra Part II; see also, e.g., S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Recalibrating The Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1159, 1243–44 (2000) (arguing that the Brandenburg test that applied to harmful speech cases is 
inappropriate when the speech ―poses a significant public danger‖); Steven J. Weingarten, Tort 
Liability For Nonlibelous Negligent Statements: First Amendment Considerations, 93 YALE L.J. 744, 
747–49 (1984) (arguing that Brandenburg should not apply to nonlibelous negligent speech, as 
negligence liability rests on unreasonably dangerous conduct, not advocacy or intent); see also Solove 
& Richards, supra note 217, at 1686 (reviewing various approaches to speech-tort liability and 
suggesting an approach centered on government power). 
 220. The cognitive programming effects could also be analyzed as an invasion of privacy. See, 
e.g., Vance v. Judas Priest, Nos. 86-5844, 86-3939, 1990 WL 130920, at *10 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 
1990). 
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cumulative manner in which violent media can cause acts of human 
aggression. In addition, aggression is known to result from many 
confounding social forces, making it difficult to trace the aggression 
directly to the violent media, even in copycat scenarios. It is 
jurisprudentially unsound to require proof of causation that is directly 
contrary to the scientific data concerning causation. The incitement test 
cannot possibly address the problematic causation issues presented by acts 
of violence allegedly caused by consumption of violent media.  
The incitement test also cannot possibly address the potential serious 
injuries to children‘s neurological health that may be caused directly as a 
result of playing violent video games, because no intervening 
―lawlessness,‖ imminent or otherwise, is involved in the cognitive-
programming process, which is also cumulative as opposed to imminent. 
In the cases brought to date, crimes against third parties were ultimately 
caused by the child‘s intervening copycat crime or other act of aggression 
allegedly caused by a child‘s reaction to violent media. But neurological 
harm may be caused directly by consumption of violent video games and 
can lead to psychological and psychiatric disorders, addiction, and other 
health problems unrelated to any acts of aggression or other intervening 
causes.
221
 That is, harm can result to a child gamer even where no third 
party is harmed by the gamer‘s reaction to the media. The direct injury to a 
child gamer may manifest in innumerable ways unrelated to intervening 
causes, such as depression, anxiety, and accompanying physical health 
problems.
222
 This direct harm to children‘s neurological health must be 
distinguished from the indirect harm resulting from subsequent acts of 
aggression allegedly caused by violent media for both tort and 
constitutional analyses.
223
 Neither type of harm can be addressed properly 
by the incitement test.  
 
 
 221. It is possible that parental negligence (in the case of minors) or contributory negligence is an 
intervening cause in some cases in which a game player suffers psychological or psychiatric harm. 
That is, if the gamer‘s personality begins to change and a reasonable person should have seen the 
change and related it to playing the video games, then continuing to play the games (or allowing a 
child to continue to play the games) is negligent conduct.  
 222. Some cases may involve intervening negligence of parents, or even the game player himself, 
such as where a parent or the player becomes aware that the player is becoming aggressive or is 
showing signs of maladaptive behavior (manifestations of neurological injury) and fails to take 
reasonable corrective action, such as by limiting game play time. Whether negligent intervening acts 
supersede the original defendant‘s fault depends on the facts, including whether the intervening 
negligence was foreseeable. Particularly in the case of a child, the game player may become addicted 
before the parents reasonably were able to identify the addiction/brain functioning problem. 
 223. Enduring neurological injury that may be caused by excessive use of violent video games is 
certainly related to later acts of aggression in some people, but it is also related to other direct harms 
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The incitement test should be abandoned. In Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass‟n, the Court did not rely on the incitement test in analyzing 
the constitutionality of criminal sales regulations of violent video games to 
minors, but rather, focused on whether causation was sufficiently proven 
to support a state‘s compelling interest in regulating such sales (and also 
found the California regulation to be vague).
224
 The Court‘s causation 
analysis in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n supports the 
proposition that the incitement test is not the proper test for analyzing the 
constitutionality of regulating violent video games.
225
  
B. The Case for a Negligence-Based Analytical Paradigm 
Reconciling First Amendment protection of violent video games with 
the social values furthered by tort liability should engage a constitutional 
application of negligence theory. Negligence theory most aptly addresses 
the known facts about violent media producers‘ fault and the relationship 
between violent media and unreasonable risks to children and society. 
Negligence law is flexible and can address the difficult causation 
problems. Proximate cause jurisprudence limits liability despite cause-in-
fact and actual harm where social policy so dictates, which can include 
First Amendment policies. At the same time, lapses of time between 
negligent conduct and resulting injury do not necessarily destroy 
causation, even where foreseeable criminal intervening acts ultimately 
cause injury, i.e., imminence is not required. Legal rules should bear a 
relationship to factual realities concerning fault and causation, as opposed 
to resting on Brandenburg-type intent and causation that have been 
established as inaccurate. Constitutionalizing the elements of negligence 
has the potential to reduce social risks while protecting free speech 
adequately, and would be superior to the inapposite incitement test. 
 
 
for the game player, which do not involve intervening acts of aggression, such as depression and other 
health problems. 
 224. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2743 (2011). 
 225. The Brown v. Entm‟t Merchs. Ass‟n majority did not require the state to prove incitement to 
regulate the sales of the games, but rather focused on problems concerning causation (as well as 
overbreadth and underinclusiveness)—indicating that incitement is not the proper test in this area of 
law. 131 S. Ct. at 2733–34. The Court also implicitly rejected the incitement test for determinining 
whether potentially harmful student speech can be punished in Morse v. Frederick. See Children‟s 
Developmental Vulnerability and the Roberts Court‟s Child-Protective Jurisprudence: An Emerging 
Trend?, supra note 45, at 786–87 n.62 (the dissent disagreed). Morse v. Frederick was a student 
speech case, which warrants less stringent First Amendment protection generally and may explain this 
decision. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1118 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:1065 
 
 
 
 
The inherent flexibility of negligence law renders it amenable to 
tailoring, depending on the outcome of the balancing factors, whether 
injury is direct or indirect, and other policy considerations. The extent to 
which violent or dangerous speech that causes a violent reaction and actual 
harm may be punished with civil liability necessarily turns on causation 
and public policy analyses concerning the media‘s propensity to influence 
the audience, the likelihood and gravity of public risk, and whether the 
risks are sufficiently foreseeable to warrant punishment. A carefully 
tailored negligence liability paradigm could more effectively and fairly 
allocate financial responsibility for social harms caused by violent or 
dangerous speech than the incitement test.  
VI. CONSTITUTIONALIZED NEGLIGENCE 
The need to avoid self-censorship . . . is, however, not the only 
societal value at issue. . . . Some tension necessarily exists between 
the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate 
interest in redressing wrongful injury. . . . [W]e are attempting to 
reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded in the 
constitutional command of the First Amendment.
226
 
This Part proposes a two-part test for constitutionalizing the tort of 
negligence for unreasonably dangerous speech that can be proven to cause 
serious injury. The proposed balancing test determines the proper level of 
evidentiary tailoring necessary to meet First Amendment demands, and is 
followed by ideas for tailoring prima facie cases of constitutional 
negligence. 
A. A Balancing Test to Determine the Level of Evidentiary Tailoring for 
Negligence Claims Arising From Unreasonably Dangerous Speech 
The Supreme Court‘s speech-tort precedent has produced three 
dominant balancing factors to determine the proper level of evidentiary 
tailoring to constitutionalize tort liability for speech: (1) the nature of the 
speech, (2) the vulnerability of the plaintiff, and (3) the state‘s interest in 
punishing the speech. The three factors are weighed to determine the level 
of evidentiary tailoring necessary to constitutionalize the prima facie case 
of negligence, and are illustrated herein relative to violent video games 
and children. 
 
 
 226. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341–42, 349 (1974).  
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1. The Nature of the Speech 
The Supreme Court has ―long recognized that not all speech is of equal 
First Amendment importance‖227 and that political speech occupies the 
―highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values‖228 in speech-
tort cases as in other areas of constitutional law. Speech characteristics that 
have animated courts‘ speech-tort decisions include: whether the speech is 
political or ideological advocacy, or concerns public affairs such that it is 
―more than self-expression‖ and ―the essence of self-government,‖229 or 
genuinely ―newsworthy‖ as opposed to purely private or confidential;230 
whether the speech is ―a far cry from the type of responsible public debate 
which the United States Supreme Court obviously intends to foster by 
cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan,‖231 such as commercial speech 
or speech that is commercial in nature and therefore ―hardy‖ and resilient 
to chilling;
232
 whether the speech affects consumers without their 
conscious awareness or consent to receive the speech, which undermines 
assumptions of conscious free choice that theoretically support an 
unregulated marketplace of ideas,
233
 such as subliminal speech that 
―sneaks into the brain‖ and bypasses intellectual processes without the 
listener‘s conscious knowledge or informed consent234 or otherwise 
contributes to market failures such as deceiving the public,
235
 rendering it 
 
 
 227. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 756, 758 (1985).  
 228. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
145 (1983)).  
 229. Id. at 1215 (quoting Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)).  
 230. Id. at 1221 (Breyer, J. concurring); see also Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751.  
 231. Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 651 F. Supp. 1397, 1401 (W.D. Ark. 1987). 
 232. See id. at 762; supra notes 187–88; see also supra note 219.  
 233. The marketplace of ideas justification for an unregulated speech market has been criticized 
and undermined considerably by scholars such as Stanley Ingber, Frederick Schauer, and Derek E. 
Bambauer, inter alios. These scholars reject the efficacy of an unregulated ―marketplace of ideas‖ to 
produce truth, and argue that First Amendment jurisprudence is too deferential to speakers. See, e.g., 
Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649 (2006) (cognitive psychology research undermines the 
concept that an unregulated market produces accurate information or truth); Stanley Ingber, The 
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984) (exposing fallacies in the notion 
of a free marketplace of ideas and explaining its persistence in First Amendment jurisprudence); 
Frederick Schauer, Is it Better to Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech and the Precautionary Principle, 
36 PEPP. L. REV. 301, 305 (2009) (current law assumes that the ―catastrophic occurrence‖ to be 
prevented is the ―large-scale restriction of speech,‖ and ―requires us to accept the uncertain risk of a 
catastrophe [such as a terrorist attack] rather than restrict speech that might cause it.‖).  
 234. Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (subliminal messages are akin 
to false and misleading speech, and are therefore ―worthy of little, if any, [F]irst [A]mendment 
constitutional protection‖).  
 235. ―False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking 
function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual‘s reputation that cannot 
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not only unworthy of heightened First Amendment protection, but 
possibly counterproductive to First Amendment values;
236
 whether the 
speech can be characterized as an information ―defect‖ due to objectively 
verifiable inaccuracies that risk human life;
237
 whether the speech 
constitutes a ―true threat‖ per se;238 and whether the speech directly aids 
the commission of a crime, rendering it an unprotected verbal crime, or a 
―speech act.‖239 Whether the speech is of ―low‖ value, such as 
pornography,
240
 or is of ―pure‖ speech may also be relevant to 
 
 
easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.‖ Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 
52 (1988) (citing Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323,340, 344 n.9 (1974)); see also, e.g., McNeil-PPC, Inc. 
v. Pfizer, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (in a lawsuit brought by dental floss 
manufacturers claiming that Listerine‘s advertisement that it was ―as effective as floss‖ at preventing 
gingivitis was fraudulent, judge commissioned scientific survey to determine the advertisement‘s 
propensity to cause consumers to buy Listerine in lieu of dental floss). Christopher Guzelian suggests 
an ―evidence-based‖ analysis regarding scientific evidence, that is, a critical systematic review of the 
best available scientific evidence that reveals whether speech is ―knowably‖ true or false. See 
Christopher P. Guzelian, supra note 207, at 886.  
 236. In Vance v. Judas Priest, the court found that subliminal messages do not advance the major 
theories underlying the First Amendment: the ―marketplace of ideas,‖ self-government, and self-
realization—because they do not provoke robust debate or advance the free flow of ideas. Vance v. 
Judas Priest, Nos. 86-5844, 86-3939, 1990 WL 130920, at *23–25 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990). 
Subliminal communication was defined as ―the projection of messages by light or sound so quickly or 
faintly that they are received by the listener below the level of conscious awareness.‖ Id. at *5. 
Subliminal messages are the ―antithesis‖ of First Amendment values because they influence and 
manipulate the behavior of the listener without his knowledge or consent, rendering it unprotected 
speech. Id. at *25. The court also found that the First Amendment includes a privacy right to avoid 
unwanted speech. Id. at *29. The court stated that―[t]he right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen 
that he may reach the minds of willing listeners.‖ Id. at 27 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 
(1949)). Further, the court noted the facts from Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, where that court 
found that streetcar audiences were ―captive‖ audiences and therefore, streetcars were not a ―First 
Amendment forum‖ for subliminal messages. Id. (citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298 (1974)). This is particularly true of speech that ―bombards‖ people, because this can be a powerful 
weapon to control others‘ minds. Id. at *28 (citing Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). The 
Judas Priest court ultimately concluded:  
The freedom to exercise one‘s thoughts is essential to the exercise of other constitutional 
rights. If an individual is not protected in his thoughts and behavior, the right of privacy 
becomes meaningless . . . . [W]hen an individual is subjected to subliminal messages without 
his knowledge and consent, his privacy rights outweigh any free speech rights of the person 
or entity publishing the subliminal message.  
Id. at *32. 
 237. See, e.g., Saloomey v. Jeppeson & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1983) (mass-published 
navigation maps are ―products‖ for strict liability purposes). One scholar suggests speech liability 
based on ―predictable negligence.‖ See Christopher P. Guzelian, True and False Speech, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 669, 670 (2010) (suggesting a standard of ―predictable‖ negligence to replace actual malice and 
strict liability); see also supra note 99. 
 238. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 
F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002) (true threats are unprotected speech). 
 239. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 240. ―Low value‖ sexual speech, for example, is subject to zoning laws based on its secondary 
effects, while political speech presumably could not be so regulated. See Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/1
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characterizing the nature of violent media such as video games.
241
 
The nature of violent video games is complicated and mixed, and the 
analysis of this factor necessarily turns in part on the nature of the injury 
alleged—the third factor discussed herein. Video games are a unique form 
of ―speech‖ that includes educational content, intellectual ideas, and 
subliminal, cognitive programming characteristics.
242
 The games contain 
political messages, military strategy, historical reenactments, accurate 
depictions of foreign lands and landmarks, and a myriad of artistic 
expressions and value judgments that generally receive strict constitutional 
protection.
243
 Video games are commercially mass-produced and 
marketed, and extremely profitable ―speech‖ that seem quite obviously 
―hardy‖ and not amenable to chilling, but they are not ―commercial‖ 
speech per se,
244
 and profitability alone does not cause speech to lose 
constitutional protection.
245
 Violent video games cannot be characterized 
as verifiably ―false,‖ ―deceptive,‖ or ―misappropriated,‖ rendering their 
regulation less predictable and more vulnerable to chilling, and warranting 
greater First Amendment protection than speech that is wrongful as an 
 
 
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62, 71 n.34 (1976) (sexual materials are low value speech and the location of their 
dissemination is subject to zoning ordinances to control unhealthy secondary effects associated with 
their location). 
 241. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) 
(―pure‖ speech is entitled to comprehensive First Amendment protection); Watts v. United States, 394 
U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (―[P]ure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First 
Amendment clearly in mind.‖); John P. Collins, Jr., Speaking in Code, 106 YALE L.J. 2691, 2691–92 
(1997) (distinguishing the most protected ―pure‖ speech from O‟Brien-type ―expressive conduct‖ and 
―pure conduct,‖ arguing that computer source code is ―pure conduct‖).  
 242. The Court in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n clarified that violent speech is fully 
protected because it does not fall within a recognized category of less protected or unprotected speech. 
131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). The majority did not distinguish the violent content of the games from 
their subliminal, cognitive-programming aspects, the latter of which clearly distinguishes video games 
from books such as Grimms‟ Fairy Tales, which the majority cited as an example of the historical 
protection of violent speech. Id. at 2736. 
 243. For example, despite their graphic violence, the enormously popular Call of Duty games 
present elaborate war scenarios and require deductive reasoning, strategy, and teamwork to survive, 
which may teach important lessons in history, weaponry, interpersonal cooperation, communication 
skills, logic and vocabulary. The Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n Court likened the 
―interactive‖ nature of video games to ―choose-your-own-adventure stories,‖ but this analogy fails to 
grasp the importance of repetition in the cognitive association creation process. 131 S. Ct. at 2737–38. 
 244. Commercial speech subject to greater state regulatory power has been defined as 
advertisements that ―[do] no more than propose a commercial transaction.‖ See Pitt. Press Co. v. Pitt. 
Comm‘n on Human Relations et al., 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). However, the credit report at issue in 
Dun & Bradstreet did not propose a commercial transaction, but the Court considered its commercial 
nature in finding that it was ―hardy‖ and unlikely to be deterred by tort liability. See Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985). 
 245. See id. at 789 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (―Time and again we have made clear that speech 
loses none of its constitutional protection ‗even though it is carried in a form that is ‗sold‘ for profit.‘‖ 
(quoting Va. Pharm. Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976))).  
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objective factual matter. The complicated features of violent video games, 
the subjectivity involved in distinguishing politics from entertainment, and 
especially the fact that violent media do not fit within an existing category 
of unprotected or less protected speech motivated the Supreme Court to 
find that violent video games are fully protected speech, criminal 
regulation of which is subject to strict scrutiny.
246
  
The indeterminate nature of the speech at issue in Snyder v. Phelps that 
caused emotional upset and infringement of personal autonomy was an 
important reason why tort liability was denied for the crass and 
personalized homophobic picketing at issue. Generally, violent media, like 
homophobic rhetoric, is more like art or opinion than fact, and cannot be 
characterized as ―misappropriated,‖ ―untrue,‖ or even ―wrongful‖ as a 
factual matter, distinguishing it from defamation or misappropriation.
247
 
To the extent that violent media cause harm indirectly based on its 
influence on speech recipients, any ―wrongfulness‖ of the speech 
necessarily turns on the foreseeability and scientific likelihood of its 
harmful influence on the audience, which is an inherently subjective 
conclusion warranting heightened speech protection.  
The nature of the injury is intertwined with the nature of violent video 
game speech. Video games‘ cognitive programming characteristics can 
lead to unhealthy changes in gamers‘ brain activity patterns, and where 
this sort of injury is alleged, the nature of the game should include the 
scientific data that supports the alleged injury. If the nature of the injury is 
characterized as programming children without their conscious awareness 
or valid consent, the relevant content of the games are akin to subliminal 
speech, which lower courts have found to be unprotected speech. In Vance 
v. Judas Priest,
248
 the court found that subliminal messages do not advance 
 
 
 246. Entm‟t Merchs. Ass‟n, 131 S. Ct. at 2736–38 (likening violent video games to other types of 
traditional violent entertainment, such as Grimms‟ Fairy Tales).  
 247. It was the absence of clear proof of causation that violent video games cause harm to children 
or society that motivated the Court to strike down California‘s sales regulation in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n. See id. at 2739 (noting that ―ambiguous proof will not suffice‖). 
Lower courts have consistently reached the same causation conclusion relative to video games. For 
example, in 2003, the Eighth Circuit found the scientific evidence that violent video games lead to 
aggression in children insufficient to meet constitutional scrutiny in reviewing a statute that limited 
sales or rentals of violent video games to minors, as the government ―failed to present the ‗substantial 
supporting evidence‘ of harm that is required before an ordinance that threatens protected speech can 
be upheld.‖ Interactive Digital Software Ass‘n v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo., 329 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 
2003). In other contexts, however, courts have not required ―substantial‖ empirical evidence to 
establish causation. See In re Ephedra Prod. Liab. Litig., 393 F. Supp. 2d 181, 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (noting that non-definitive scientific evidence can be used to establish causation, and 
―[i]nconclusive science is not the same as junk science‖). 
 248. Vance v. Judas Priest, Nos. 86-5844, 86-3939, 1990 WL 130920 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/1
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the major theories underlying the First Amendment—marketplace of 
ideas, self-government, and self-actualization—because subliminal 
messages do not provoke robust debate or advance the free flow of ideas, 
and indeed constitute the ―antithesis‖ of these values because they 
influence and manipulate the behavior of the listener without his 
knowledge or consent.
249
 Subliminal communications infringe upon 
freedom of thought and mind that the First Amendment seeks to protect 
and are not really speech at all.
250
 The Brandenburg standard did not 
apply, because subliminal messages affect the brain differently than 
advocacy or incitement.
251
 The court also found that the First Amendment 
protects individuals to be free from intrusive speech,
252
 particularly if they 
are ―bombarded‖ with it,253 because speech is a ―powerful weapon‖ to 
control others‘ minds.254 The court concluded:  
The freedom to exercise one‘s thoughts is essential to the exercise 
of other constitutional rights. If an individual is not protected in his 
thoughts and behavior, the right of privacy becomes meaningless 
. . . . [W]hen an individual is subjected to subliminal messages 
without his knowledge and consent, his privacy rights outweigh any 
free speech rights of the person or entity publishing the subliminal 
message.
255
  
The following year, a Georgia federal court decided Waller v. 
Osbourne,
256
 another case in which subliminal commands in rock music 
allegedly caused teen suicide. The court followed the Nevada District 
 
 
1990). 
 249. Id. at *25.  
 250. Id.; see also, e.g., David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 335–46 (1991) (arguing that speech that advocates ideas through reasoning 
should be the most protected under the First Amendment). 
 251. See Judas Priest, 1990 WL 130920 at *22; see also James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 
2d 798, 809–11 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (plaintiffs argued for strict liability based on a failure to warn of 
subliminal messages contained in the violent media, but the court found that subliminal messages were 
not ―products‖ without analyzing whether subliminal messages were unprotected speech). 
 252. The right of free speech includes a right to avoid unwanted speech. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 
336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (―[T]he right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the 
minds of willing listeners.‖); Judas Priest, 1990 WL 130920 at *25–27 (citing Lehman v. City of 
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)) (streetcar audiences are ―captive‖ audiences and therefore, 
streetcars were not a ―First Amendment forum[s]‖). 
 253. Judas Priest, 1990 WL at *28. 
 254. Id. at *29 (citing Pub. Utils. Comm‘n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)).  
 255. Id. at *32. The Court found that in order for liability to attach to producers of subliminal 
messages that allegedly cause harmful consequences on the part of listeners, intent is a necessary 
element, making an analogy to invasion of privacy. Id. at *10. Ultimately, the court found no intent, 
and no liability. Id. at *21. 
 256. 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991). 
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Court‘s reasoning in Vance v. Priest and found that subliminal messages 
contained in otherwise protected speech rendered it unprotected or much 
less protected in accordance with its similarity to false and misleading 
commercial speech and other forms of speech ―extremely limited in their 
social value,‖ relegating such speech ―to a class worthy of little, if any, 
first amendment constitutional protection.‖257  
The cognitive-programming effect of video games occurs 
automatically without the gamer‘s knowledge or informed consent. This 
makes this aspect of video games similar to subliminal speech in terms of 
bypassing marketplace assumptions. While the gamer consciously chooses 
to play the game, this type of consent should not encompass consent to the 
creation of unhealthy unconscious associations and attendant negative 
health consequences, particularly as to children. As Justice Alito 
recognized in his concurring opinion in Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass‟n, ―[t]here are reasons to suspect that the experience of 
playing violent video games just might be very different from reading a 
book, listening to the radio, or watching a movie or television show,‖258 
and ―the Court is far too quick to dismiss the possibility that the 
experience of playing video games (and the effects on minors of playing 
violent video games) may be very different from anything that we have 
seen before.‖259 Accordingly, where the nature of the injury results directly 
from unconscious programming, this affects the analysis of the nature of 
the speech itself. 
If the nature of the games is characterized as influencing the audience 
and instigating acts of aggression that cause third party harm, they cannot 
be distinguished from any other type of violent media such as a violent 
film—other than by virtue of their effectiveness, which relates back to 
their cognitive programming potential. The games‘ potential to influence 
the audience based on content alone, as opposed to content and 
programming potential, render them akin to pure speech, warranting the 
strictest constitutional protection. However, dual direct and indirect risks 
 
 
 257. Id. at 1148.  
 258. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 259. Id. at 2748. The cognitive programming potential of video games was not addressed by the 
majority, which dismissed the idea that video games may be different in kind than books or movies, 
asserting that ―interaction‖ is ―nothing new,‖ and that player participation in ―violent action‖ is ―more 
a matter of degree than of kind.‖ Id. at 2737–38. The scientific research on the special effects of video 
games in terms of learning, programming cognitively, and modifying brain activity patterns through 
interactive repetition undermines the Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n majority‘s view on this point and 
clarifies that there are distinct potential harms: cognitive programming beyond the gamer‘s awareness 
and the related potential problem of subsequent antisocial and aggressive conduct. 
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presented by violent video games distinguish them from true ―pure‖ 
speech such as the live advocacy at issue in Brandenburg v. Ohio or the 
Vietnam protest armbands worn by schoolchildren in Tinker v. Des 
Moines.
260
 If the armbands in Tinker had risked serious health 
consequences to the children that wore them, they might be analogous in 
terms of the nature of the speech.
261
  
There is no escaping the fact that violent video games do not merely 
communicate ideas intellectually that can influence behavior. The games 
require repetitive conduct—virtual acts of violence—to receive the speech, 
and this aspect of the games generate physical and psychological 
responses in children in particular that have nothing to do with persuasion 
of intellectual ideas or conscious choice in accepting or rejecting ideas.
262
 
At the very least, the cognitive programming potential inherent in violent 
video games renders them impure speech, at least as to gamers who are 
reasonably unaware that they are being programmed or who lack 
competency to consent to such programming. It is therefore not possible to 
analyze fully the nature of the speech without also considering the level of 
the player‘s vulnerability to altered brain activity (and attendant possible 
behavioral reactions to it) and the nature of the state‘s interest in regulating 
the speech.
263
  
2. The Vulnerability of the Plaintiff 
The vulnerability of harmful speech victims and their need for state law 
protection should be considered in accordance with the Supreme Court‘s 
 
 
 260. 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (school children had a First Amendment right to wear black 
armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War, as the armbands were ―pure [political] speech‖).  
 261. However, had the armbands been determined to risk children‘s health, the case almost surely 
would have gone the other way. Surely avoiding physical harm to children is at least as important as 
avoiding disruption of the school environment. See id. at 514.  
 262. See, e.g., U.S. v. O‘Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O‘Brien‘s decision to speak out by burning 
his draft card was considered speech mixed with conduct. Id. at 376–77. In the case of violent video 
games, the children are receiving speech that requires conduct, as opposed to speaking out via conduct, 
but there is no reason to analyze the nature of the speech as ―pure‖ or mixed differently just because 
its conduct aspects relate to its reception as opposed to its dissemination. 
 263. The nature of violent video games is per se different as to adults, as they are less vulnerable 
to the potentially harmful, unconscious cognitive influences and in any event are competent to assume 
the risks. See supra Part I.A. Indeed, adult consumers‘ more stable cognitive matrix renders the effects 
of violent video games more akin to ―preconscious suggestion‖ than true subliminal speech, at least 
where they are aware of the risks of consuming violence. See Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 
1147, 1149 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (distinguishing ―preconscious suggestion,‖ where a listener is aware of 
the words or message but might not understand them, from ―subliminal‖ speech, which operates 
beyond the ―conscious awareness‖ of the listener). This is particularly true in light of the high-profile 
lawsuits alleging that violent media caused murderous audience reactions. 
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policy favoring greater state law protection commensurate with the injured 
party‘s level of vulnerability. Public figure versus private individual status 
in the defamation and privacy claim context is obviously not relevant to 
violent media analysis because the plaintiff‘s access to counter-speech and 
assumption of the risk of character attacks are irrelevant. However, 
plaintiffs‘ vulnerability to harm caused by speech should still be 
considered relevant to the state‘s level of interest in protecting them.  
Courts should review all factors that bear on victims‘ ability to protect 
themselves, including: whether the victims are disproportionately or 
exclusively children and adolescents, considering their developmental 
vulnerability to speech influences
264
 and recognized general need for 
government protection;
265
 whether the speech interferes with the 
recipient‘s fairly informed choices, such as where the speech is subliminal 
or fails to warn of known risks or deceives the consumer; and whether the 
speech monopolizes the market
266
 or contributes to market failures that 
render the speech recipient less able to choose fairly among competing 
ideas.
267
 
 
 
 264. See supra Part I. 
 265. See, e.g., N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757–58 (1982) (states have a compelling interest in 
safeguarding children from physical and psychological harm). Early philosophers such as Plato and 
Aristotle believed that children are impressionable and should be protected from harmful speech. See 
Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children From Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 566 n.2, 622 (2005) 
(suggesting an analytical framework for deciding issues of ―child-protection censorship‖); see also 
SAUNDERS, supra note 143, at 2–3 (child-protection censorship is compatible with First Amendment 
values); Kevin Saunders, The Cost of Errors in the Debate Over Media Harm to Children, 2005 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 771 (2005) (arguing that the risks to children posed by violent media are too high a price 
to pay, since children will not be harmed much, if at all, by denying them access to violent media, i.e., 
the loss of speech is minimal, and it is of questionable value).  
 266. The District Court for the District of Arizona found that the First Amendment seeks to 
protect marginalized and insular minority viewpoints, such that there is less need to protect 
majoritarian speech or speech that ―monopolizes‖ the market, and that antitrust-based speech liability 
has been imposed where speech is ―false or misleading.‖ See Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co. v. 
Lightning Prot. Inst., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048 (D. Ariz. 2003).  
 267. Speech that monopolizes the market or capitalizes on human weaknesses such as cognitive 
errors and the availability heuristic should be entitled to less First Amendment protection because the 
speech undermines the search for truth that a free market presupposes results from market competition. 
See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 233, at 696–703 (cognitive research undermines the theory of the 
marketplace of ideas); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Are We Buyers Or Hosts? A Memetic Approach to the 
First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1213, 1214, 1220, 1243 (2001) (―ideas do not sit passively like 
products in an ordinary market,‖ and some are ―aggressive‖ and ―over-achieving‖ and can replicate 
like ―viruses,‖ and can cause great injury to humans, rendering an unregulated marketplace of ideas 
insufficient to protect people from harmful ideas); see also Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 822 (2008) (―speech institutions‖ that play a cost-reducing 
role in the marketplace of ideas, ―such as schools and universities,‖ should be given more First 
Amendment deference). 
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The scientific research concerning the developmental vulnerability of 
children should affect the speech-tort balance, and this factor mitigates 
toward some deference to state law protection of children. As explained in 
Part I, children and adolescents are acutely vulnerable to media influences 
compared to adults, and are particularly vulnerable to adopting 
maladaptive cognitive associations. The Supreme Court has specifically 
embraced the research on children‘s developmental vulnerability relative 
to their lesser culpability and greater likelihood of rehabilitation in 
criminal matters,
268
 as well as their more impressionable nature, greater 
propensity to form addictions, and diminished ability to recover from 
addiction.
269
 Children are undeniably physiologically more vulnerable to 
influences than adults and are not competent to assume the risks or to 
consent to altering their brain activity patterns long-term for the same 
reason that they are not competent to drop out of elementary school or 
consent to sexual relations: they lack the maturity and experience to 
appreciate the consequences of their choices. The aggressive marketing of 
violent video games to children because they are ―more likely . . . to be 
influenced‖ by advertising270 renders them particularly vulnerable as 
targets of profit-driven companies that capitalize on their known 
vulnerability, which increases the state‘s interest in protecting them. The 
state‘s interest is particularly strong considering the addictive qualities of 
violent video games, which are well documented, especially as to 
children.
271
  
This factor may operate to create different levels of prima facie case 
tailoring for the same media depending on whether the injured claimant is 
a child or adult
272
 in the same way that the evidentiary requirements for 
defamation vary in recognition of differing levels of the plaintiff‘s 
vulnerability. Variable tailoring would not contravene the Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n Court‘s rejection of a variable standard for 
criminal regulation of sales of violent video games to children because 
criminal regulation of speech has historically been subjected to a different 
test altogether—one that does not consider actual harm to a particular 
child as this balancing approach to tort liability for speech does. 
Negligence analysis is a case-by-case review of the facts, and this factor 
 
 
 268. See, e.g., Graham v. Fla., 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).  
 269. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007). 
 270. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
 271. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text. 
 272. Where an adult victim is harmed by a child, as in the Columbine High School case, the child 
analysis should apply if the harm that the dangerous media caused to the child in turn caused the harm 
to the ultimate victim. 
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would be grounded in actual, proven harm in an individual case. Tort 
regulation is inherently narrowly tailored and does not pose overbreadth or 
underinclusiveness problems because the plaintiff must prove actual 
damages and causation. Proof of actual injury should lessen chilling 
concerns and in any event justifies shifting the burden of the actual costs 
to the speech producer as opposed to children or society at large. 
Therefore, even if negligence liability for injury caused by violent video 
games is subject to strict tailoring as to adults, it should be subject to a less 
strict level of tailoring relative to children, particularly where the injury 
alleged directly results from altered brain activity patterns caused by 
playing video games. 
3. The State‟s Interest in Punishing Speech/The Nature of the Injury 
The nature of the interest that the state seeks to protect through tort 
regulation should be reviewed as part of any constitutional speech-tort 
balancing test. Supreme Court precedent clarifies that emotional and 
reputational harm are less worthy of state law protection than property 
interests.
273
 Established tort policy values serious bodily harm or death 
over competing property interests and considers the breadth and severity 
of the public risk as part of any risk-utility analysis.
274
  
The nature of the injury allegedly caused by violent video games 
should be separated into different categories depending on whether the 
games allegedly caused direct injury to a child‘s brain or indirect injury 
through intervening acts of aggression allegedly traceable to the games‘ 
influence on behavior. The Supreme Court has recognized that the states 
have a compelling interest in protecting children‘s physical and 
psychological well-being,
275
 even to protect children from poor parenting 
choices.
276
 If a child claims neurological or other injury arising directly 
 
 
 273. See supra Part IV. 
 274. See, e.g., Brown v. Martinez, 361 P.2d 152, 155 (N.M. 1961) (use of deadly force against 
watermelon thieves on defendant‘s property held actionable in tort because human life is more 
important than property rights). In addition, the Supreme Court recognized in Gertz v. Welch that 
―[t]he protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the 
individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.‖ Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 
341 (1974) (emphasis added) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)); see also Herceg v. Hustler, 814 F.2d 1017, 1025–26 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., 
concurring in the decision and dissenting in part) (―[N]o federal court has held that death is a 
legitimate price to pay for freedom of speech.‖). 
 275. N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757–58 (1982).  
 276. See, e.g., Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (upholding Massachusetts‘ laws 
restricting child labor against parents‘ religious freedom challenge, finding that parents‘ authority is 
not absolute and can be restricted constitutionally if doing so is in the interests of a child‘s welfare).  
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from the games‘ cognitive programming effect or addictive characteristics, 
there may be no intervening cause, which eliminates the most difficult 
proximate cause issue. To the extent that there is injury to a child‘s 
cognitive or neurological health, the state clearly has a compelling interest 
that should operate to lower the level of tailoring necessary to 
constitutionalize a tort claim.  
In relation to the types of harm that have been alleged in most tort 
cases brought against producers of unreasonably dangerous speech to 
date—serious injury or death to third parties resulting from intervening 
acts of the speech recipients—the state‘s interest in preserving life is 
generally considered more compelling than its interest in protecting 
reputation, emotions, or even proprietary interests.
277
 Arguably, more 
deference to state law is appropriate. However, the complicated and 
confounding causation issues concerning the effects of violent video 
games on players‘ behavior render it inadvisable to relax evidentiary 
requirements based on the nature of the injury, because to do so would 
undermine the constitutional mandate to raise evidentiary burdens to 
protect speech from punishment where wrongful intent, causation, and 
injury are indeterminate. That is, it could unduly risk free speech to relax 
tort claims‘ prima facie requirements based on correlations without clear 
proof of direct causation because uncertainty about liability lies at the 
heart of chilling concerns. The Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass‟n 
majority was not persuaded by the scientific proof that violent video 
games cause acts of aggression by gamers due to confounding intervening 
causes of aggression generally, and it therefore applied strict scrutiny to 
violent video game sales regulation. Accordingly, when the nature of the 
injury stems from the effect of the games on the gamers‘ behavior, strict 
tailoring is appropriate.
278
  
B. Constitutionalized Negligence: Suggestions for Prima Facie Cases 
A common law prima facie case of negligence has five elements that 
must be pled and proven by a preponderance of evidence to establish 
liability: duty, breach, cause-in-fact, proximate cause, and damages or 
injury.
279
 Evidentiary modifications to the prima facie case should be made 
 
 
 277. See supra note 259. 
 278. Note, however, that it may be difficult to distinguish direct harm to neurological functioning 
from indirect harm caused by a player‘s reaction to the games. For example, desensitization to 
violence and the ability to commit acts of violence are intimately related. 
 279. See, e.g., Selvage v. Gainey Transp. Serv., Inc., 859 So. 2d 813, 815 (La. Ct. App. 2003).  
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to constitutionalize negligent speech-tort liability similar to the way in 
which the Supreme Court has constitutionalized the elements of other torts 
to meet First Amendment scrutiny. 
1. Narrow Tailoring  
The prima facie case evidentiary burdens must be raised significantly 
to meet First Amendment demands relative to fully protected speech that 
warrants narrow tailoring to constitutionalize negligence liability. The 
evidentiary burdens should be raised in accordance with New York Times 
v. Sullivan and its progeny, with the most rigorous evidentiary burdens 
concerning causation to account for the indeterminate nature of violent 
video game speech where intervening causes are present—a special 
causation problem not present in New York Times v. Sullivan.  
The negligent intent counterpart to actual malice in defamation law is 
actual knowledge of the danger posed by the speech and conscious 
indifference to the safety of foreseeable victims. The evidentiary burdens 
to establish the elements of duty and breach must be elevated beyond 
ordinary negligence or even gross negligence to require proof of reckless, 
willful and wanton behavior,
280
 or substantial certainty
281
 that the behavior 
will occur to meet First Amendment demands under a strict tailoring 
approach. For example, if it were proven that a publisher of unreasonably 
dangerous speech knew of the speech risks and blatantly disregarded such 
risks to maximize profits, such as by targeting advertisements to children 
who are particularly vulnerable to injury, such facts might meet the intent 
burden of proof proposed herein.
282
 Proof of fault (duty and breach) should 
be raised from a preponderance of evidence to clear and convincing 
evidence to maximize speech protection.
283
  
 
 
 280. This level of fault requires a showing that defendant ―was conscious of the risk or had 
specific reason to know about it and proceeded without concern for the safety of others.‖ DOBBS, 
supra note 63, at 351 (footnotes omitted). This differs from gross negligence in that it requires proof of 
a mental element that is not necessarily required to prove gross negligence. Id.; see also infra note 289.  
 281. See Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094–95 (Wash. 1955) (a child who pulled a chair out 
from under someone who was about to sit down could be held to have intended the harm under 
―substantial certainty‖ analysis despite no proof that the child pulled the chair out for the purpose of 
causing harm). The level of fault for ―substantial certainty‖ lies somewhere between purposeful intent 
to harm and recklessness and establishes intent for tort analysis where the defendant may not have had 
a purpose to bring about the harm, but knew to a substantial certainty that his actions would produce 
the harm. See DOBBS, supra note 63, at 48.  
 282. Some violent video game producers‘ marketing behavior toward children for videos they 
deem inappropriate for children could meet this level of intent. See supra Part II. 
 283. A court could even require the criminal burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. At 
least one state has applied the criminal burden of proof to limited issues of civil liability, such as 
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―But for‖ factual causation should be required to establish the link 
between the unreasonably dangerous speech and the injury, to limit 
liability to those harms that would not have occurred in the absence of the 
speech. For example, where a person copycats precisely a scenario that 
they were exposed to in violent media, this could suffice to show that ―but 
for‖ the media, the crime would not have been committed, depending on 
all of the facts. Where multiple defendants are involved, such as where a 
person is influenced and harmed by multiple violent media, proof of 
causation is more complicated. In those circumstances, the individual 
defendant‘s contribution to the ultimate harm could be proven through 
alternatives to ―but for‖ causation, such as through substantial factor 
causation, which allows liability against defendants who are not the sole 
cause of injury but contributed to it substantially.
284
 Alternative cause-in-
fact analysis may be necessary, considering the confounding factors that 
influence an individuals behavior, and comports with modern tort policy 
that a cause be substantial, not the sole cause, to impose tort liability.
285
 
Concerns about confounding factors warrant raising the evidentiary 
burden for factual causation to a clear and convincing standard. 
Foreseeability of harm is the cornerstone of modern proximate cause 
analysis, and since intervening criminal acts are usually the ultimate cause 
of harm in unreasonably dangerous speech cases, foreseeability of such 
acts should be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Courts could also 
require proof of substantial injury, such as serious bodily harm or death, to 
further limit tort liability for fully protected speech. Under this approach, 
property damage, economic losses, or emotional harm could be per se 
insufficient to state a prima facie case, so that tort liability reaches no 
further than necessary to protect the most vital state interests, consistent 
with the Gertz v. Welch Court‘s added element of actual damages.286 
Disallowing punitive damages is another possible way of limiting tort 
liability to protect speech.
287
  
 
 
punitive damages. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011); DOBBS, 
supra note 63, at 1069.  
 284. See, e.g., Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal, 248 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1952).  
 285. See, e.g., Spann v. Shuqualak Lumber Co., 990 So. 2d 186, 190 (Miss. 2008) (emissions from 
lumber company causing a dense fog contributed to car collision, rendering the company potentially 
liable along with drivers who may also be liable); Landers, 248 S.W.2d at 734 (where tortious acts of 
two or more wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible injury, all wrongdoers are deemed jointly and 
severally liable).  
 286. 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1973). 
 287. Justice Breyer suggested this during oral arguments in Snyder v. Phelps. See Snyder v. 
Phelps: A Prediction Based on Oral Arguments and the Supreme Court‟s Established Speech-Tort 
Jurisprudence, supra note 165, at 428 n.74.  
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Applying this test may result in a high level of dismissals in actions 
against publishers and producers of fully protected dangerous speech, but 
the First Amendment demands no less for such speech.
288
 Strict tailoring 
of the prima facie case still addresses the difficult causation issues in a 
manner superior to the inapposite Brandenburg test and recognizes a 
balance of rights that may send a normative message to publishers of 
unreasonably dangerous speech that they are not entirely immune from 
tort liability. 
2. Intermediate Tailoring  
In Gertz v. Welch, a fault level of ordinary negligence met intermediate 
tailoring, to accommodate competing speech-tort interests. However, in 
cases where the ultimate injury results from intervening causes, the fault 
burden of proof should be raised to account for the indeterminate nature of 
the speech. Requiring proof of gross negligence
289
 by clear and convincing 
evidence more adequately protects speech subject to intermediate 
tailoring. This proposed analysis accords with the Eleventh Circuit‘s 
reasoning that intermediate tailoring of a negligence prima facie case is 
met upon proof that the defendant disregarded a ―clear and present‖ 
danger in publishing a gun-for-hire advertisement, and also accords with 
the Georgia Supreme Court‘s ―clear and present danger‖ standard for 
children‘s dangerous television programming.290  
Factual causation could be established through substantial factor 
causation where ―but for‖ causation cannot be proven. That is, unlike 
narrow tailoring, the link between the speech and the injury could be 
proven by substantial factor causation only,
291
 even where there is no 
 
 
 288. See, e.g., Entm‘t Software Ass‘n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059–67 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (reviewing scientific data on the effects of violent media and concluding that causation was 
insufficiently established). If the evidence that violent media causes violent behavior is as inconclusive 
as the courts have found, then raising the evidentiary burden for causation should address First 
Amendment concerns adequately. Courts could still dismiss lawsuits upon a finding of inadequate 
causation as a matter of law. 
 289. Gross negligence is defined as a ―high . . . degree of negligence‖ or ―conduct that is 
appreciably more risky, or less beneficial, than conduct qualifying as ordinary negligence.‖ DOBBS, 
supra note 63, at 350–51.  
 290. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. It was the District Court for the Middle 
District of Alabama that created the ―clear and present danger‖ test to raise the evidentiary 
requirements to meet an intermediate level of scrutiny in Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 
which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. See 968 F.2d 1110, 1116 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992).  
 291. Unlike the strict tailoring approach suggested herein, it would be sufficient to establish that 
the media played a substantial role in bringing about the injury even if other factors also caused the 
injury.  
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multiple defendant problem, such as where social forces interacted with 
the media, resulting in injury. As with narrow tailoring, proximate 
causation should be established by clear and convincing evidence, and 
substantial personal injury could be required to further protect speech. 
Certain negligent speech cases, such as Herceg v. Hustler might have 
survived constitutional scrutiny under this level of tailoring for negligence 
liability. 
3. Minimal Tailoring  
Where speech does not occupy the highest rung of constitutional 
protection (such as pornography or commercial speech) and harms 
vulnerable persons (such as children), minimal tailoring to establish a 
prima facie case of negligence may be appropriate.
292
 Minimal tailoring 
may be appropriate also in relation to direct neurological injury to children 
caused by playing violent video games. Relaxed scrutiny in speech-tort 
precedent is basically the common law prima facie case of negligence, 
which sufficiently protected First Amendment values in Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. However, the mixed nature of 
violent video games renders them more vulnerable to chilling than false 
statements of fact, warranting heightened evidentiary burdens to the prima 
facie case. Proof of negligence, cause-in-fact, and proximate cause should 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence to safeguard speech of a 
nature warranting less-than-full constitutional protection.  
CONCLUSION 
The prevailing negligent speech-tort jurisprudence essentially 
immunizes speech that may create serious risks to the public, and to 
children in particular. The jurisprudential basis is free speech, but speech 
that causes actual harm imposes costs to society. Tort immunity for such 
speech does not change this fact. Rather, it shifts the costs of harm from 
the speech producers to the public at large and may increase the sum total 
of social harm. Current negligent speech rules do not strike the optimal 
balance of interests, and a better approach is possible. Constitutional and 
tort policies should be reconciled to optimize the balance of free speech 
 
 
 292. Indeed, this is precisely what Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit argued in dissent in Herceg v. 
Hustler, e.g., that the sexually explicit speech produced for commercial gain should not receive full 
First Amendment protection where it caused a child‘s death. See Herceg v. Hustler, 814 F.2d 1017, 
1028 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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rights with social interests, and such reconciliation could enhance public 
safety while staying true to First Amendment values. This might be 
accomplished by constitutionalizing the tort of negligence to allow limited 
liability for dangerous speech that foreseeably causes serious injury or 
death. Such an approach could produce optimal care among producers of 
unreasonably dangerous speech, while protecting speech consistent with 
constitutional guaranties. 
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